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Convergence and Its Discontents:
A Reconsideration of the Merits of Convergence of
Global Competition Law
Thomas K. Cheng*
Abstract
This Article examines the recent phenomenon of the convergence of competition law
regimes across the globe. The increasing harmoniation of competition law, at both the
procedural and substantive levels, has been widey discussed and applauded in recentyears. This
Article casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that convergence necessarily constitutes a positive
development in global competition law. After analyling the causes of the phenomenon, this
Article argues that there should be limits to the pursuit of convergence. First, the costs of
convergence should not be overlooked. The most important of such costs is the loss of national
regulatory prerogative. Second, the multitude of goals that are pursued by divferent jurisdictions
in their competition laws poses serious obstacles to convergence. Finally, the need to incorporate
economic development considerations and cultural variations in market behavior further
cautions against wholesale harmoniZation of competition laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If there is one most important development in international competition
law in recent years, it is convergence. With the proliferation of competition law
regimes in the last three decades, there has been increasing concern about
inconsistent enforcement and consequently a drive to harmonize competition
law globally. Led by established jurisdictions, most notably the US and the EU,
and a host of international organizations, such as the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International
Competition Network (ICN), proponents of convergence have attempted to
build a consensus on various aspects of competition law and encouraged other
jurisdictions to converge on these so-called international best practices.' These
best practices are encapsulated in the form of guidelines, recommendations, and
discussion papers. The expectation is that the emerging jurisdictions will
incorporate these practices and converge toward the approaches to competition
law of the established jurisdictions.
I There are no formal definitions of "established" and "emerging" jurisdictions. The two
indisputably established jurisdictions in competition law are the US and the EU. OECD member
states are generally also considered established jurisdictions to varying degrees. Emerging
jurisdictions are those countries that adopted competition law relatively recently-over the last
decade or two-or those that only stepped up enforcement recently after years of inactivity.
Examples include India, China, and most developing countries.
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What distinguishes convergence in competition law from attempts at
harmonization in other areas of law is the voluntary nature of the enterprise and
the lack of formal, binding international treaties. With the abandonment of the
Singapore agenda in the World Trade Organization (WTO),2 it seems that the
international competition community has decided to eschew formal
harmonization through international treaties and has instead focused its efforts
on voluntary convergence. The established jurisdictions and the international
organizations make no explicit attempt to compel or pressure other jurisdictions
to conform to the international best practices. Instead, these other jurisdictions
are left to decide on their own whether and to what extent they will align their
domestic regimes with the international consensus. Convergence can be said to
be a form of informal harmonization, while the pursuit of a binding international
treaty is more appropriately described as formal harmonization. Harmonization
in competition law is distinctly informal in nature.
The general view is that convergence benefits the global competition law
community by reducing cross-jurisdictional divergences and minimizing
instances of inconsistent enforcement. At first blush, the logic of harmonization
seems irresistible. With the internationalization of markets and the expanding
reach of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), the regulation of markets needs
to be globalized as well. A uniform set of rules should apply to business conduct
by a firm operating in multiple jurisdictions. Conventional wisdom holds that
this would reduce compliance costs and facilitate cross-border transactions. This
Article seeks to demonstrate the need to question and qualify this logic. There
are, in fact, a number of important reasons why the case for convergence may
have been overstated and why regulatory diversity across jurisdictions should be
preserved.
This Article is divided into seven sections. Section I has introduced the
basic premise of the Article. Section II provides an overview of the proliferation
of competition law and the phenomenon of convergence. Section III examines
in greater detail the key actors and mechanisms of convergence and briefly
explains the reasons for its success thus far. Section IV delves into the costs and
benefits of convergence and casts doubt on the prevailing wisdom that
harmonization of competition law is a universally positive development. Section
2 See generally Martin Khor, The "Singapore Issues" in the WTO: Evolution and Implications for Developing
Countries, 33 TWN Trade and Dev Ser 1 (2007). The "Singapore issues" refer to four permanent
working groups on transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, trade and
investment, and trade and competition. At the fifth Doha Ministerial at Cancun in 2003,
persistent deadlock led to three of the issues' being dropped in order to refocus negotiations on
trade facilitation. The issues were officially abandoned by the August 1, 2004, decision of the
General Council (The July Package). See World Trade Organization (WTO), Decision Adopted by the
General Council on 1 August 2004 1(g), WTO Doc No WT/L/579 (Aug 2, 2004).
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V focuses on the disagreement concerning the policy goals and some key
concepts in competition law and examines its implications for convergence.
Section VI surveys a number of economic and socio-political characteristics of
developing countries and proposes possible accommodations of these
characteristics in competition law. Section VII suggests that competition law
principles and enforcement need to incorporate cultural considerations, which
provide a further reason for divergences. Section VIII concludes the Article.
II. PROLIFERATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND THE DRIVE
FOR CONVERGENCE
Competition law promotes free competition by prohibiting anti-
competitive conduct by firms.3 Competition law has proliferated across the
globe in recent years. Fewer than thirty jurisdictions had competition law thirty
years ago.4 In many of those thirty jurisdictions, enforcement was far from
active.s By early 2011, it is estimated that more than 110 jurisdictions had
adopted competition law.' In conjunction with this rapid proliferation of
competition law has been a push for convergence. Both at the national and the
international levels, concerns have arisen about the growth in the number of
competition law regimes and potentially inconsistent enforcement.7 Until about
fifteen years ago, the US and the EU were the only two jurisdictions in the world
that mattered to the operation of multinational corporations. Due to factors
both related and unrelated to competition law, the dynamics have shifted and a
number of new key players have emerged.
Since the late 1990s, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has begun
to direct its attention to foreign companies, including Microsoft, Intel, and
3 See Martyn D. Taylor, International Compedion Law: A New Dimension for the PTO 1 (Cambridge
2006).
4 See Brendan Sweeney, International Compedton Lw and Poliy: A Work in Progress, 10 Melb J Intl L
58, 58 (2009).
5 For example, competition law enforcement was de-emphasized in Japan for decades until the
1990s. See David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and GlobaliZation 211-13 (Oxford
2010); Masako Wakui, Antimonopoly Law: Competition Law and Pohay in Japan 16-36 (Arima 2008).
6 See Sweeney, 10 Melb J Intl L at 58 (cited in note 4).
7 See Jane E. Willis and Matthew P. Garvey, Promoting Convergence on And-Monopoly Standards (Law
360 Sept 30, 2008), online at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/8c9e440a-f59a-46be-
belf-la788d0d984c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/edlOldf-73d8-4fd9-bfe-
23f8eb636450/Law360.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011); Tefft Smith and Catherine Fazio, Convergence: A
Call to Arms (Kirkland and Ellis 2003), online at
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2492/Documentl /Euromoney.pdf
(visited Oct 24, 2011); James S. Venit, Modernization and Enforcement - The Need for Convergence: On
Procedure and Substance, European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of
Cartels (Hart 2006).
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Qualcomm, in its enforcement activities. In the 1990s, the Japan Fair Trade
Commission (JFTC) also became more active in enforcing the Japanese Anti-
Monopoly Act.' The emergence of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia,
India and China), especially China and India, as global economic powerhouses
following the financial crisis of 2008 has propelled these countries' competition
law regimes to the forefront of the global competition community. The People's
Republic of China's (PRC) Anti-Monopoly Law has attracted intense scrutiny
since it was promulgated in 2007 and came into effect in August 2008."
Meanwhile, India's competition law regime has been revamped in recent years. A
new statute, the Competition Act, was passed and a new agency set up to
rejuvenate competition law enforcement in the country." With the global
competition community shifting from a bipolar to a multi-polar world, there is
increasing concern that the growing number of jurisdictions will enforce their
competition laws inconsistently, raising the compliance costs to MNCs operating
in multiple jurisdictions.
This anxiety is by no means unfounded. From the mid-1990s onward, the
generally harmonious relationship between US and EU competition authorities
8 See Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), 2006 Annual Report **21-26, online at
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type-cd=53&pageld=0301 (visited Oct 24,
2011); KFTC, 2009 Annual Report **45-49, online at
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type-cd=53&pageld=0301 (visited Oct 24,
2011); KFTC, 2010 Annual Report **49-53, online at
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type-cd=53&pageld=0301 (visited Oct 24,
2011).
9 Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No 54 of 1947
aJapan). See Gerber, Global Competition at 213-15 (cited note 5); Wakui, Andmonopoy Law at 31-38
(cited in note 5). This shift in attitude was partly due to pressure by the US, which had
complained for years that lax enforcement of competition law had allowed Japanese firms to erect
entry barriers against American firms. It was also partly due to the realization, after the burst of
the economic bubble in the late-1980s, that the economic model that had allowed Japan to attain
phenomenal growth after the Second World War, which had de-emphasized domestic
competition, no longer sufficed. Japan must turn to competition to inject vitality into its
moribund economy. See Wakui, Animonopoy Law at 30-38.
10 One reflection of the amount of attention on the Anti-Monopoly Law is the fact that the
Antitrust Law Journal published by the American Bar Association (ABA) devoted one full issue
to it. See 75 Antitrust L J 1 (2008). The overriding concern has been that the Chinese (PRC)
government will use competition law for protectionist purposes as opposed to for promoting
domestic competition. This concern was not assuaged by the Ministry of Commerce's rejection of
Coca-Cola's acquisition of Huiyuan, a major Chinese fruit juice and beverage company, in 2008.
See Stephanie Wong and Wing-gar Cheng, China Blocks Coca-Cola's $2.3 Billion Huiyuan Bid
(Update2) (Bloomberg Mar 18, 2009), online at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awHnSlHJ2Usw (visited Nov
10, 2011).
11 See generally Aditya Bhattacharjea, India's New Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment, 4 J
Competition L & Econ 609 (2008).
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has been repeatedly marred by disputes, mostly in the form of US complaints
about EU enforcement activity against American corporations. These disputes,
including the GE-Honeywell merger and the European Commission's action
against Microsoft, have at times assumed an acrimonious tone, with the US
officials accusing the European Commission of misapplying competition law
principles to the detriment of effective competition.12 If two mature jurisdictions
at relatively similar stages of economic development and with similar
conceptions of competition cannot avoid serious confrontations with each
other, one may justifiably despair about the prospect of cooperation in a multi-
polar global community. Convergence is an attempt to forestall future conflicts.
The criticisms of the EU by the US officials and commentators betray the
Americans' presumption that there exists a set of universally applicable
competition law principles.' If the EU officials had applied these principles
correctly, the Americans argue, they would have reached the same results as their
American counterparts. It is this notion of the universality of competition law
that has propelled the recent drive for convergence. This notion is premised on
the existence of a common set of principles to which jurisdictions converge, and
the belief that these principles are flexible enough to be adapted to countries
under disparate socio-economic circumstances. These principles are built upon
modern industrial organization economics, and are mainly informed by US and
EU experiences. Thus, while the drive for convergence is motivated by a desire
to minimize cross-jurisdictional conflicts, the theoretical foundation is built
upon the notion of the universality of competition law.
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT CONVERGENCE
A. Different Levels of Convergence
Convergence of competition law can take place at procedural, substantive,
and normative levels. Procedural convergence refers to the harmonization of
procedural rules that apply in competition cases. The only area of competition
12 See Gerber, Global Competition at 95-98 (cited in note 5); Deborah Platt Majoras, GE-Honywell: The
U.S. Decision, Remarks Before the Antitrust Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia **13-17 (Nov 29,
2001), online at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9893.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011);
Thomas 0. Barnett, Statement on European Microsoft Decision (Dept of Justice Sept 17, 2007), online
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2007/226070.htm (visited Oct 24, 2011).
13 See, for example, William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Efects: It is a Long Way from
Chicago to Brussels, 10 Geo Mason U L Rev 533 (2002); John R. Wilke, US Antitrust Chief Critides
EU Decsion to Reect Merger of GE and Hongwell, Wall St J A3 (July 5, 2001) (quoting Assistant
Attorney General Charles James: "Clear and longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the
antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors . . . . [The EU decision] reflects a significant
point of divergence").
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law that has witnessed significant international procedural convergence is merger
review.14 In other areas of competition law, the applicable procedural rules tend
to follow the general civil and criminal procedural laws of the presiding
jurisdiction. There has been no attempt to harmonize them, apart from the
insistence on basic procedural fairness.
Substantive convergence refers to the harmonization of substantive
competition law principles, in other words, the standard for the legality of
various modes of business conduct. Substantive convergence is the main focus
of most convergence efforts. It is beneficial to firms because it provides
uniformity of legal rules, thereby lowering their regulatory compliance costs. It
can take place at the administrative level by way of guidelines and policy
statements. This will be referred to as administrative substantive convergence in
the remainder of this Article. It can also take place at the judicial level through
court decisions. This will be referred to as judicial substantive convergence.
While administrative substantive convergence is relatively well understood,
judicial substantive convergence has received less attention from commentators
and officials. Domestic courts do refer to the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions
when confronted with a novel issue. The High Court of Australia routinely
refers to cases from other jurisdictions. One example is Queensland Wire Industries
v Broken Hill Proprietay,'s which concerned a refusal to supply. In its discussion
of market definition, the lead opinion of this Australian High Court case
referred to the EU cases of Hoffman-La Roche" and United Brands,17 the US
Second Circuit Alcoa case,'" and the US Supreme Court cases of Grinnell' and
American Tobacco.20 In his discussion of the definition of exclusionary conduct,
Judge Dawson discussed United Shoe Machiney Corp21 and Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen
Hzghlands Skiing Corp.2 2 In Cancun Trading No 24 CC and Others and Seven-Eleven
14 The timeline for the merger review process of a number of jurisdictions, such as China, has
aligned with the EU model. See Anti-Monopoly Law of People's Republic of China, Arts 25-26
(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Aug 30, 2007 and
effective Aug 1, 2008).
1s 167 CLR 177 (High Ct 1989) (Aus).
16 Id at 188, citing Hoffman-La Roche (& Co v Commission, 1 ECR 461 (1979).
17 Id, citing United Brands v Commission, 1 ECR 207 (1978).
18 Id at 189, citing United States v Aluminum Co ofAm, 148 F2d 416, 425 (2d Cir 1945).
19 Queenslandat 189, citing United States v Grinnell Corp, 384 US 563, 571 (1966).
20 Id, citing United States vAm Tobacco Co, 328 US 781 (1946).
21 Id at 202, citing United States v United Shoe Machinery Corp, 110 F Supp 295, affd in 347 US 521
(1954).
22 Id, citing Aspen Skiing Co vAspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585 (1985).
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Corp (Pty) Ltd,23 the South African Competition Tribunal referred to the US cases
of Soconj-Vacuum Oil and Dr Miles24 and the EU case of Pronuptia v Schillgalis25
when discussing the legality of resale price maintenance and a number of other
restrictive practices in the franchise context. In Axiom Plastics Inc v El Dupont
Canada Co,26 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice discussed the US Supreme
Court case Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machiney Corp27 and the Third Circuit case
In re Linerboard when addressing the issue of the "passing on" defense to direct
purchaser claims. 28 The EU courts have also discussed relevant US case law on a
number of occasions. The European Court of Justice did so in Tetra Pak
International SA v Commission,29 for instance, when it was asked to decide whether
a predatory pricing claim requires proof of the likelihood of recoupment of
losses under EU law.
Normative convergence focuses on the alignment of cultural norms
regarding competition. These norms may, and in fact do, vary widely across the
globe. Arguing against a globally centralized competition law regime, Professor
Oliver Budzinski observes that citizens of different jurisdictions "can have
diverging majority preferences about elementary competition policy
characteristics, for example, the goal(s) of competition policy, its relation to
other political and societal goals, the borderline between fair and unfair
(legitimate and illegitimate) means of competitive interaction.""1 Social
psychologists have documented that different cultures hold divergent attitudes
toward competitiveness. Some, such as the Anglo-Saxon cultures, are more
competitive-and more receptive to competitiveness as a social trait-than
others, such as Asian cultures.32
Normative convergence represents the deepest kind of convergence and is
hence the most elusive. It is perhaps for this reason that it has received the least
23 18/IR/Dec99 (ZACT 2000) (S Afr).
24 Id at 44 n 12, citing United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 150, 228 (1940) and Dr Miles
MedicalCo vJohn D Parke & Sons, 220 US 373, 1408 (1911).
25 Cancun Trading, 18/IR/Dec99 at 40 n 11, citing [1986] ECR 353 (1986).
26 87 OR (3d) 352 (Super Ct Just 2007) (Can).
27 Id at 127, citing 392 US 481 (1968).
28 Axion Plastics, 87 OR (3d) at 129-30, citing In re Linerboard Antitrust Lig 305 F3d 145 (3d Cir
2002).
29 Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR 1-5951 (1996).
30 See id.
31 Oliver Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition: Competence Allocation in International Competition
Pokiy 71 (Edward Elgar 2008).
32 See Geert Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond, The Confudus Connection: From Cultural Roots to
Economic Growth, 16 Organizational Dynamics 5, 10-15 (1988).
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attention among the three types of convergence. It is, however, critical to the
success of the convergence project for a number of reasons. First, competition
law enforcement will be most effective if government officials and members of
society share a common and genuine belief in the benefits of competition.
Second, the law generally, and competition law specifically, must correspond to
local norms to gain legitimacy. For instance, in a country that is new to
competition law and where a "competition culture" is not deeply ingrained, the
immediate introduction of the criminalization of cartels may not be appropriate.
Its citizens may genuinely believe that price fixing is not a sufficiently
blameworthy conduct to warrant criminal sanctions. The disconnect between the
law and social norms may be so significant that competition law loses its
legitimacy. This is a particularly grave concern given that competition law is
perceived as a foreign import in many countries. Extensive and sustainable
substantive convergence will likely require some degree of normative
convergence-that is, the gap between the social norms regarding competition
prevailing in different countries must narrow.
B. The Mechanisms for Convergence
Convergence has taken place at both the national and the international
levels. On the national level, emerging jurisdictions have made considerable
effort to learn from the experiences of more established jurisdictions, especially
the US and the EU. The evolution of the law on resale price maintenance (RPM)
in recent years provides an apt illustration of convergence. In the 2007 case
Leegin Creative Leather Products v PSKS,33 the US Supreme Court overturned the
per se rule for RPMs, which had been in force in the US for almost a century, in
favor of the rule of reason. 4 Since then, other jurisdictions have either
reconsidered their own positions on the legality of RPMs or adopted the new US
position. The South Korean Supreme Court, despite clear statutory language
suggesting a per se approach to RPMs, followed the lead of the US court and
applied the rule of reason to decide a pharmaceutical case." Similarly, the
33 551 US 877, 881 (2007).
3 The Court explained, "The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice
restrains trade in violation of 5 1 [of the Sherman Antitrust Act]." Id at 885. But, "[t]he rule of
reason does not govern all restraints. Some types 'are deemed unlawful per se ... . The per se rule,
treating categories of restraints as necessarily illegal, eliminates the need to study the
reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at work." Id at 886
(internal citations omnmiitted).
3s See Faaez Samadi, Korean Court Overrules Competition Law in Pharma Appeal, Global Competition
Rev (Nov 26, 2010), online at
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/29380/korean-court-overrules-
competition-law-pharma-appeal/ (visited Oct 22, 2011).
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Indonesian competition authority, the Commission for the Supervision of
Business Competition (KPPU), announced in Regulation 8/2011 that RPMs will
be subject to a rule of reason analysis.36 It is unlikely that these jurisdictions
would have adopted this position on RPMs absent Leegin.
Convergence on the national level has been even more pronounced in
cartel enforcement. Up until two decades ago, the US was the only jurisdiction
with an active criminal enforcement program against cartels. Most other
jurisdictions did not even impose criminal sanctions on cartel members. Over
the last decade or so, a number of jurisdictions, such as Australia, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, and the UK, have either introduced criminal sanctions or
made them more readily available." To complement criminal cartel
enforcement, leniency programs have been widely adopted, even in jurisdictions
such as Japan, for which such programs had previously been assumed to be
unsuitable.3 8 It had been argued that because of Japan's cultural emphasis on
harmony and social cohesion, an enforcement apparatus that relies on betrayal
had a small chance of success." It is no exaggeration to state that a global
consensus has emerged, at least among the enforcers, on the competitive harms
caused by cartels and the most effective ways of combating them, including a
combination of high fines, imprisonment of executives, and leniency programs
to induce defections. No other area of competition law has witnessed the same
degree of convergence.
Convergence has not been confined to the national level. A number of
international organizations, namely the ICN, the OECD, and the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), have played a
pivotal role in bringing about global convergence. UNCTAD has been active in
international competition law for decades, with a special focus on developing
countries. One of its early accomplishments was the adoption of the Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices, otherwise known as the UN Set, in 1980.41 In
addition to the UN Set, UNCTAD also published the Model Law on
36 See Norton Rose Group, Indonesia Consults on Draft Guidelnes on Discriminatory Practices (May 2011),
online at http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/51671 /competition-law-
developments-in-east-asia (visited Oct 7, 2011).
37 See Caron Beaton-Wells and Ariel Ezrachi, eds, Criminaligng Cartels: Citical Studies of an
International RegulatoU Movement 109-10,130-34, 183 (Hart 2011).
38 See Akinori Uesugi, How Japan is Tackling EnforcementActiviiesAgainst Cartels, 13 Geo Mason L Rev
349, 362 (2005).
39 See id.
40 See Gerber, Global Competition at 112-16 (cited in note 5).
41 See id; UNCTAD, The United Nations Set of Pnnciples and Rules on Competition § IV(C), UN Doc
TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980).
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Competition in 2010.42 This is a model competition code of sorts that attempts
to address the needs of developing countries. It includes an extensive
commentary on the current practices of not only the established jurisdictions,
but also the developing country ones. UNCTAD holds annual meetings that
bring together officials and experts from across the globe to discuss competition
law issues with particular attention on developing country jurisdictions. These
meetings also feature peer review of national competition law regimes. Armenia,
Costa Rica, and Indonesia are some of the recently reviewed jurisdictions.43
The OECD Competition Committee, currently chaired by Judge Fred~ric
Jenny of the French Cour de Cassation, has been no less active in international
competition law. Similar to UNCTAD, the OECD conducts peer reviews of
competition law regimes," most recently of Egypt.45 Furthermore, the OECD
has published recommendations and best practices on a wide variety of
competition law and policy issues, including competition assessment of
legislation, merger review, structural separation in regulated industries, cartel
enforcement, cooperation among OECD member states, and exemptions from
competition law.46 It has also produced guidelines on bid rigging in public
procurement. 4 7 The work products of the OCED are influential. Its guidelines
and recommendations, especially the 1998 Recommendations on Hard Core
Cartels and 2005 Recommendations on Merger Review, are highly regarded.48
The OECD also hosts the annual Global Forum on Competition, which is a
high-level gathering of officials and experts mainly from developed countries.
Lastly, the organization that has been most widely credited with the success
of convergence on the international level over the last decade is the ICN. It was
founded in 2000 by the competition authorities of a number of jurisdictions, all
42 UNCTAD, ModelLaw on Competition (2010), UN Doc TD/RBP/CONF.7/L.1-L.13 (2010).
43 UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Policy: Armenia, UN Doc
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2010/1 (2010); UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition
Policy: Costa Rica, UN Doc UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2008/1 (2008); UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer
Review on Competition Policy: Indonesia, UN Doc UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2009/1 (2009).
44 See, for example, OECD and IDB, Competition Law and Policy in Brazil: A Peer Review (2010).
45 Brazil, Egypt, and Panama have been reviewed recently.
46 See, for example, OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Competition Assessment, OECD
Competition Committee Doc C(2009)130 (2009); OECD, OECD Guiding Principles for Regulatory
Quality and Performance (2005); OECD, Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information Between
Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations (2005). For the OECD's full list of
Recommendations and Best Practices on Competition, see OECD, Recommendations and Best
Practices on Competition, online at
http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3746,en_2649_37463_4599739_1-1_1-37463,00.html
(visited Oct 24, 2011).
47 See generally OECD, Guidelinesfor Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2009).
48 Gerber, Global Competition at 112 (cited in note 5).
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of which, except for South Africa and Zambia, are also OECD members.49
What distinguishes the ICN from other international organizations is that it is
not a formal international organization, like the UN or the WTO, in which
members are admitted on a national basis. 0 Instead, it is an informal network of
competition authorities. According to the factsheet published by the ICN, it now
boasts 104 member agencies from 92 jurisdictions." Apart from its annual
meeting, which is probably the largest gathering of competition law officials
from across the globe, the ICN exerts its greatest influence through the
recommended practices and other work products produced by its working
groups. The five current working groups cover advocacy, agency effectiveness,
cartels, mergers, and unilateral conduct.5 2 The merger review working group, for
example, has issued recommended practices on both procedural and substantive
aspects of merger review53 and has produced handbooks on merger guidelines
and investigative techniques.5 4 Membership of these working groups is drawn
from agencies and non-governmental advisors, who are predominantly private
practitioners from established jurisdictions.
It is worth discussing briefly how the activities of these international
organizations promote convergence." Peer review facilitates convergence to the
extent that the reviewers' suggestions are shaped by their own experiences with
49 The founding members include Australia, Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, South Africa, the UK, the US, and Zambia. Although Israel was not a member of the
OECD when the ICN was launched, it became an OECD member in 2010.
50 See Hugh M. Holman and William E. Kovacic, The International Competition Network: Its Past,
Current and Future Role, 20 Minn J Intl L 274, 275 n 3 (2011).
51 See ICN, ICN Factsheet and Key Messages (April 2009), online at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc608.pdf (visited Oct 24,
2011).
52 For a list of the current ICN working groups, see ICN, Current Working Groups, online at
http://www.internationalcompetitonnetwork.org/working-groups/current.aspx (visited Oct 24,
2011).
53 See ICN, Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures, online at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc588.pdf (visited Oct 24,
2011); ICN, Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, online at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc3l6.pdf (visited Oct 24,
2011).
54 See ICN Merger Working Group: Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, ICN Merger Guidelines
Workbook (Apr 2006), online at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc321.pdf (visited Oct 24,
2011); ICN, ICN Investzgative Techniques Handbook for Merger Review (June 2005), online at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc322.pdf (visited Oct 24,
2011).
5 For an extended discussion, see generally Claire R. Kelly and Sungjoon Cho, Promises and Perils of
New Global Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 Chi J Intl L 491 (2012).
Vol. 12 No. 2444
Convergence and Its Discontents
their respective jurisdictions and what they perceive to be international best
practices, which are mostly drawn from the established jurisdictions. The impact
of socialization at meetings and gatherings should not be underestimated.
Discussions at the meetings of these international organizations generally focus
on the practices of the established jurisdictions. Attendance at these meetings is
likely to encourage, both consciously and subconsciously, officials from the
emerging jurisdictions to emulate these practices. This tendency to emulate is
probably reinforced by the relative lack of experience and expertise of the
officials of the emerging jurisdictions, many of whom consider the ICN and
other international organization meetings to be mainly educational opportunities.
The most important way in which these international organizations
promote convergence is through the issuance of best practices and
recommendations. The work products of the OECD and the ICN in the area of
merger review have been particularly influential. Using the terminologies of
Professors John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, who conducted an exhaustive
study of the harmonization of business regulation, the established competition
law jurisdictions pursue convergence through what is known as modeling. They
define modeling as "[globalization of regulation achieved by observational
learning with a symbolic content.""6 The established jurisdictions put forward
their models through their own guidelines or their input into the work products
of international organizations. These models are then emulated by the emerging
jurisdictions. The learning that takes place through modeling is augmented by
the peer review process and socialization at the various international meetings.
Although the foregoing discussion seems to suggest that convergence at
the national and international levels constitute two distinct processes, the two
are, in fact, closely interrelated. As explained earlier, convergence by national
competition authorities is often pursued in response to efforts by the
international organizations. Meanwhile, judicial convergence is less closely tied
to convergence efforts at the international level. The various mechanisms of
convergence, such as international meetings, peer review, and issuance of
guidelines and best practices, have less relevance for the judiciary. 7 Judicial
convergence mainly takes place when judges on their own initiative refer to cases
56 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation 25 (Cambridge 2000).
s7 The one possible minor exception is the issuance of guidelines. It is widely acknowledged that the
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines have garnered considerable respect from the US judiciary.
Judges have often followed the analytical framework laid out in the Guidelines when deciding
merger cases. To the extent that the same phenomenon is observed in other jurisdictions,
issuance of guidelines may indirectly facilitate judicial convergence. See, for example, ICN Merger
Working Group: Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, ICN Merger Guidelnes Workbook *93 (cited
in note 54).
Winter 2012
Cheng
445
Chicago Journal of International Law
from other jurisdictions." However, even judicial convergence is not insulated
from activities at the international level. If the domestic authority frequently cites
foreign cases, which is bound to happen as convergence among the agencies
intensifies, the courts will be more likely to rely on foreign jurisprudence.
Moreover, judges also attend international meetings and receive training from
foreign officials and experts, which will familiarize them with foreign cases and
practices."
Modeling can take place from the core to the periphery, in other words,
from the established jurisdictions to the emerging jurisdictions, or within the
core itself.6 These two types of modeling are observed in competition law as
well. There is convergence between the US and the EU, and convergence of the
rest of the world to the trans-Atlantic core. Although intra-core convergence is
an integral part of the global convergence process, this Article will focus on
periphery-to-core convergence. As a theoretical phenomenon, periphery-to-core
convergence raises questions that have hitherto received scant attention, such as
the relationship between competition law and development and between
competition law and culture, which will form the focus of this Article.
Aside from modeling, the only other mechanism in Braithwaite's and
Drahos's classification that has been utilized extensively in competition law is
capacity building. The established jurisdictions have provided extensive technical
5s Even if judges do decide to refer to foreign jurisprudence, there is certainly no obligation to
follow it. For instance, in France Telecom v Commission, the European Court of Justice expressly
refused to follow the US Supreme Court's lead in Brooke Group and impose a requirement of
proof of likelihood of loss recoupment in predatory pricing cases. See France Telecom v Commission,
Case C-202/07 P, [2009] ECR 1-2369, referencing Brooke Group Ltd v Brown &' Wilkamson Tobacco
Corp, 509 US 209 (1993). Despite the importance of the authorities in competition law
enforcement, the lack of a conscious effort to pursue judicial convergence will limit the ultimate
degree of uniformity that can be achieved across jurisdictions.
s9 UNCTAD provides capacity building and technical assistance to developing countries in the area
of competition law and policy. Training courses on the implementation of competition policy
were provided to judges as well as enforcement officials in numerous countries including
Namibia, the Philippines, and Ukraine. See UNCTAD, Review of Technical Assistance, Advisory and
Training Programmes on Competition Law and Poli, UN Doc TD/RBP/CONF.5/5 *9 (Sept 25,
2000). The EU also provides training for judges of its member states on competition law. See
Vlaams-Europees Verbindingsagentschap, Training of National Judges in EU Competition Law and
Judicial Co-operation between National Judges (Apr 4, 2011), online at
http://www.vleva.eu/call/training-national-judges-eu-competition-law-and-judicial-co-operation-
between-national-judges-0 (visited Oct 24, 2011); The Jevons Institute, University College
London and Institute d'Economie Industrielle, Universit6 des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse,
Training offudges in EC Competition Law and Economics (2009), online at www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judges-
programme/JudgesTraining-brochure.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011).
60 See Braithwaite and Drahos, GlobalBusiness Regulation at 136 (cited in note 56).
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assistance to emerging jurisdictions." When a South Korean official offers
technical assistance to Vietnam, the frame of reference will inevitably be the
South Korean regime. This is to be expected, as that is the regime with which
the official is most familiar. Consciously or not, the South Korean official will be
facilitating convergence of Vietnamese competition law to the South Korean
model. Capacity building thus may indirectly contribute to convergence.
Technical assistance in capacity building is not confined to implementation
and enforcement. It has been offered at the legislative stage as well. During the
drafting of China's Anti-Monopoly Law, many established jurisdictions,
including the US, the EU, Japan, and South Korea, offered technical advice to
the Chinese government.62 It was widely known at the time that there was a
battle among the advisors, especially between the US and the EU, to persuade
the Chinese to follow their respective models. In this instance, the sources of
technical assistance were actively pushing for convergence to their own models.
Compared to harmonization in other realms of business and economic
regulation, competition law is noteworthy for the limited range of mechanisms
that have been deployed. Apart from modeling and capacity building,
Braithwaite and Drahos refer to military coercion, economic coercion, systems
of reward, reciprocal adjustment, and non-reciprocal coordination as
mechanisms for harmonization. The first three should be self-explanatory, and
have not been deployed at all in competition law. The fourth and fifth ones
require some explanation. They refer to adjustments made by parties to the
negotiation of international treaties. Braithwaite and Drahos define reciprocal
adjustment as "[g]1obalization of regulation achieved by non-coerced negotiation
where parties agree to adjust the rules they follow," while non-reciprocal
coordination "[o]ccurs when movement toward common rules happen without
all parties believing they have a common interest in that movement." 63 As there
are no formal treaty negotiations, these two mechanisms are absent from the
convergence of competition law.
The limited range of harmonization mechanisms deployed and the absence
of formal treaty negotiations have their advantages and disadvantages. The main
advantage is that the pursuit of convergence in competition law has been spared
61 See D. Daniel Sokol and Kyle W. Stiegart, Exporting Knowledge through Technical Assistance and
Capacity Building, 6 J Comp L and Econ 233, 236-37 (2010). The US Department of Justice (DOJ)
and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have provided technical assistance to more than fifty
countries around the world from 1988 to 2008. See US DOJ and FTC, Charting the Future Course of
International Technical Assistance at the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice: A Report
*1 (2009), online at http://www.ftc.gov/oia/wkshp/docs/exp.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011).
62 See H. Stephen Harris, The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Ani-Monopoy Law of the People's
Republic of China, 7 ChiJ Intl Law 169, 175 (2006).
63 Braithwaite and Drahos, GlobalBusiness Regulation at 25 (cited in note 56).
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the protracted and at times acrimonious negotiations that have plagued other
areas of economic regulation, such as trade law and intellectual property law.64
The main international organizations driving convergence of competition law
have largely been able to reach agreement among their members through
constructive discussions and consensus building. The kind of horse-trading and
tit-for-tat negotiations that have marred treaty negotiations in other areas of
global economic regulation are thankfully absent in competition law.
There are two main reasons for the absence of these problematic
negotiations: first, the final products-model codes, recommendations, or best
practices-produced by these organizations are not formally binding. A member
is free to ignore a particular recommendation as it sees fit. Second, there are
generally no overriding national interests at stake in the creation of these
documents. Convergence of competition law is not about preferential treatment
of foreign goods or opening of national markets, in which various parties may
consider their interests to be at odds with each other's. Rather, it is about
narrowing differences between the various national regimes. The general belief is
that within the convergence enterprise, all of the jurisdictions are striving toward
the most effective competition law principles. Convergence of competition law
is not the tit-for-tat that generally characterizes trade negotiations, which helps
to minimize conflicts and confrontations.
The absence of explicit negotiations may have its own disadvantages as
well. Negotiations are important for precisely the same reasons that they may be
counterproductive. They give each party the opportunity to provide input into
the final product. In Braithwaite's and Drahos's parlance, negotiations provide a
platform for reciprocal adjustments. While convergence of competition law
differs from trade and other international economic treaty negotiations in that
there are fewer overt exchanges of interests, this does not mean that parties to
convergence should be denied a meaningful opportunity to provide input into
the consensus-building process. Without such an opportunity, convergence risks
being reduced to a series of non-reciprocal coordinations by the emerging
jurisdictions.s
This dearth of opportunity for input is compounded by the fact that the
international consensus to which other jurisdictions are expected to converge
64 See Oxford Analytica, Fate of WITO's Doha Round Uncertain (Forbes.com Dec 19, 2006), online at
http://www.forbes.com/2006/12/18/wto-doha-trade-business-cx_1218oxford.html (visited Oct
24, 2011); Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS
Agreement and Policy Options 3-4 (Zed 2000).
65 According to Braithwaite and Drahos, non-reciprocal coordination occurs "when movement
toward common rules happens without all parties believing they have a common interest in that
movement. One party believes the new rule is in their interest, but this belief is not reciprocated."
Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation at 25 (cited in note 56).
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has been largely informed by the US' and EU's experiences. Although the
recommendations and best practices issued by the international organizations do
not blindly reflect US and EU practices, they are nonetheless heavily influenced
by them.66 This is a crucial observation. So long as the US and EU approaches
are suited for the rest of the world, convergence is to be welcomed. However, if
for any reason the trans-Atlantic consensus does not adequately address the
needs and circumstances of other countries, convergence could be
counterproductive." The trans-Atlantic consensus will suit other jurisdictions if
either there exists a set of universally applicable competition law principles or
the consensus building process contains an effective mechanism to solicit and
incorporate input from all stakeholders to address their needs. As will be
explained subsequently, the search for universally applicable competition law
principles is unlikely to be fruitful. This creates a greater need for inclusiveness
in the consensus-building process.
The extent to which the consensus-building process within international
organizations incorporates input from the emerging competition law
jurisdictions varies. UNCTAD has probably done the most to incorporate the
concerns and needs of developing countries, which form the bulk of the
competition law jurisdictions in the world. OECD is a club of developed
nations. Its recommendations and best practices are formulated by and primarily
intended for its own members, which are predominantly developed countries.
While non-OECD members may become observers of the Competition
Committee, their input into the final products of the Committee is necessarily
66 For example, one can certainly detect the influence of the US and the EU merger guidelines in the
ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook. See ICN Merger Working Group: Investigation and Analysis
Subgroup, ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook (cited in note 54). Also, in the OECD peer review
issued in 2006, Argentina was encouraged to focus on anti-cartel enforcement. See OECD,
Competition Law and Poiy in Argentina: A Peer Review *46 (2006), online at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/57/37970045.pdf (visited Nov 9, 2011). While there is a
general consensus among developed countries that anti-cartel enforcement is the most important
aspect of competition enforcement, some have argued that abuse of dominance is a more serious
problem in developing countries, especially where there is a powerful state-owned sector. In the
peer review report issued in 2010, the OECD Competition Committee recommended that the
Brazilian authority focus on structural remedies as opposed to behavioral remedies in merger
cases. See OECD Competition Committee, Compeidon Law and Pody in BraZik A Peer Review at 78
(cited in note 44). This recommendation also reflects to some extent the enforcement strategy of
the US agencies, which generally prefer structural remedies.
67 This concern would be alleviated if the US and the EU took into account the possibility of
convergence when fashioning their approaches to competition law issues. However, there is no
evidence that this is done. One may even argue that it would be absurd for them to do so and
resolve cases differently in light of the possibility of convergence. After all, their regulations and
guidelines are primarily intended to provide guidance on their own enforcement strategies and
methodologies and not as models for other jurisdictions.
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limited." In fact, the purpose of the observer program seems not to be to obtain
non-member input, but to help spread the OECD's views on competition law
and policy to non-members." ICN membership covers competition authorities
from across the world. It has the mandate to forge a truly global consensus.
However, the way in which its working groups function may invite criticisms of
overrepresentation by developed-country private practitioners and cast doubt on
the representativeness of its consensus. 70 In particular, there seems to be
insufficient recognition within the ICN of the need for competition law
principles to be tailored to local circumstances. All of this places the onus on the
emerging jurisdictions to exercise caution when deciding the extent to which
their domestic laws and practices should converge to the international
consensus.
C. Effectiveness of Convergence as a Harmonization Strategy
The convergence promoted by these international organizations is of a soft
rather than a hard kind. The choice of mechanisms-modeling and capacity
building-limits the kind of convergence that can be achieved. Proponents of
convergence do not endeavor to adopt a formally binding code or principles on
competition law, as was attempted under the Havana Charter by the aborted
International Trade Organization (ITO) after the Second World War and under
the so-called Singapore agenda within the WTO in the 1990s.7' Harmonization
within the ITO and the WTO would have been formally binding. It would have
involved a top-down effort, as opposed to a bottom-up process. Instead,
international organizations, such as the ICN, the OECD, and UNCTAD,
promote convergence that is initiated on a voluntary basis by the jurisdictions
68 See OECD, Competition Committee, Pro-Active Strateg vis-a-vis Non-Members, OECD Doc
DAF/COMP(2005)26 (2005). The main role of the observers is "to associate themselves to
certain Council Recommendations, to undergo a peer review exercise, to make written
contributions to Committee roundtables, to actively participate in the Committee's outreach
events and to disseminate the Committee's recommendations and best practices to other
authorities." Id at 2.
69 See id at 7. The Proactive Strategy document enumerates a list of criteria for evaluating the
performance of observers and states that renewal of observer status is not automatic, so as to give
observers the incentives to meet the expectations of the Committee, one of which is to "associate
themselves to certain Council Recommendations." Id.
70 See Hollman and Kovacic, 20 Minn J Intl L at 304 (cited in note 50) ("To date, the principal
contributions have been made by NGAs from the private sector. As noted above, this has raised
questions within the ICN about whether the network ought to engage academics, consumer
groups, and think tanks more fully in its program.").
71 Gerber, Global Competition at 38-52 (cited in note 5); WTO, Understanding the W0: Css-Cufting
and New Issues, online at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif e/bey3_e.htm
(visited Oct 24, 2011).
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themselves. In fact, the term "convergence" was probably chosen to avoid the
connotation of compulsion or top-down imposition and to emphasize the
voluntary nature of the enterprise.
The lack of binding force, however, has not undermined the effectiveness
of the approach. Competition law stands out as a field of law that has achieved a
considerable degree of global uniformity without resorting to formally binding
legal instruments. The most notable example is the 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (1992 Guidelines) issued by the US Department of Justice and the
US Federal Trade Commission. A casual examination of the horizontal merger
guidelines issued by most major jurisdictions would reveal a substantial degree of
similarity to the 1992 Guidelines. 2 The analytical approach laid down in those
Guidelines, especially the Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in
Price (SSNIP) test used for market definition, has been embraced by most
jurisdictions. Until the issuance of a new set of guidelines by the US agencies in
2010, the 1992 Guidelines were widely regarded as the gold standard for merger
review across the globe."
It is worth pondering what accounts for the remarkable success of
convergence thus far, especially in light of its voluntary nature. There are a
number of reasons for this success. First and foremost, competition law is a
highly technical area of law that requires intimate knowledge of a variety of
disciplines, such as economics, accounting, and business. Its highly
interdisciplinary nature sets it apart from most other areas of law and contributes
to its unfamiliarity to most legal practitioners and even judges outside of the
field. This unfamiliarity is compounded by the fact that competition law is
relatively new to most jurisdictions. Most of the existing competition law
jurisdictions only adopted their law within the last three decades.74 The lack of
expertise and experience in most emerging jurisdictions renders them more
receptive to knowledge transfer from more established jurisdictions.
Another reason for the success of convergence is the largely administrative
nature of competition law enforcement. With the exception of the US,
72 See William Blumenthal, The Challenge of Sovereignty and the Mechanisms of Convergence, 72 Antitrust L J
267, 270 (2004) ("For twenty-two years the U.S. Merger Guidelines have offered something of a
template for substantive merger analysis."). See generally Rachel Brandenburger and Joseph
Matelis, The 2010 U.S. HoriZontal Merger Guidelines: A Historical and International Perspective, 25
Antitrust 48, 49 (2011).
73 An examination of horizontal merger guidelines adopted in other jurisdictions since 1992 reveals
that many of them are similar to the 1992 Guidelines. See, for example, European Commission,
Guidenes on the Assessment of HoriZontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of
Concentrations between Undertakings 2008 OJ (C 265) 7; KFTC, GuideknesforM&A Review (2007); UK
Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading, Merger Assessment Guidelines (2010).
74 See UNCTAD, Guidebook on Competition Systems, UN Doc UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/2 (2007).
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enforcement authorities rather than private parties bring the bulk of competition
cases in most jurisdictions." Private action plays a very small role in a majority
of jurisdictions." The preponderance of public enforcement gives competition
authorities a powerful lever to steer development of the law in their respective
jurisdictions. They can do so through careful selection of cases. If an authority
believes that a particular mode of business conduct, such as unilateral refusal to
deal, should be legal, the authority could limit the judiciary's opportunity to
reach a contrary result by declining to bring cases involving such conduct. The
role of the authorities is even more prominent in merger review than in
enforcement against restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance. Few merger
cases are litigated. In most transactions, the authorities have the final word on
whether a merger may proceed. This state of affairs is conducive to
convergence, as the number of actors that need to agree within a jurisdiction for
successful convergence is reduced by virtue of the administrative nature of
competition law enforcement.
Two other characteristics of competition law enforcement further facilitate
convergence. The first is the reliance on informal instruments such as guidelines.
Because guidelines do not legally bind the authorities themselves or the courts in
most jurisdictions, and are mere articulations of enforcement policies, the
authorities have considerable discretion over their content. There is generally
little or no national legislative involvement in the issuance of guidelines. This
means that whatever consensus is reached among the enforcement officials can
be given direct effect through these informal instruments without being
adulterated by domestic political compromise, which is a necessary feature of the
legislative process.
The second characteristic is the case-specific nature of competition law
enforcement. Competition law does not impose detailed ex ante regulation that
applies across the board. Business conduct is presumed to be legal unless
determined otherwise ex post by the authorities or the courts. This contrasts
with, say, banking regulation, which requires the regulator to issue detailed rules
on the operations of a bank. Banks need to know with what rules they must
75 Close to 90 percent of the antitrust cases in the US are brought by private plaintiffs. See Robert
H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis, An Evaluation of PrivateAntitrust Enforcement: 29 Case Studies, Interim
Report for the American Antitrust Institute Private Enforcement Project 3 (November 8, 2006).
See also Bureau of Justice Statistics, Antitrust Cases filed in United States District Courts by Type of Case,
1975-2010 in Kathleen Maguire, ed, Sourcebook of Criminal jusice Statistics Online (Albany 2010),
online at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412010.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011).
76 For instance, the European Commission has been trying for years to encourage private
enforcement of competition law in the EU. It has issued a number of consultation documents on
this. See, for example, European Commission, White Paper on Damages Actions for Beach of the EC
Antitrust Rules, EC Doc COM(2008) 165 final (2008).
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comply in advance, and contradictory rules may render compliance impossible.
Therefore, in order for banking regulation to converge globally, the regulators
must reach an explicit agreement on the content of the various detailed national
rules." The sort of open-ended convergence process that has taken place in
competition is unlikely to work as a harmonization strategy for banking
regulation. The lack of detailed ex ante rules in competition law reduces the need
for the authorities to pursue express negotiations and creates an environment
conducive to voluntary convergence. The international consensus is articulated
by established jurisdictions and international organizations. Other jurisdictions
can then choose to converge upon it at their own pace and to the extent suitable
for their domestic circumstances. This explains why the voluntary convergence
model, which is somewhat unusual in the international harmonization context,
has worked so well for competition law.
IV. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CONVERGENCE
Having examined the phenomenon of convergence in some detail, the rest
of this Article will be devoted to the questions of how far convergence should
continue and whether there are reasons to caution against a push for further
convergence. It is important to clarify the precise focus of the ensuing
discussion. As suggested in the previous Section, convergence can take place at
the procedural level, the substantive level, and the normative level. With respect
to substantive convergence, this Article has no objection to the propagation of
competition law analysis that is effects-based and incorporates economic
learning. The competitive effects of a business practice should be determined by
the application of sound economic principles to solid empirical data. The
emerging competition law jurisdictions should guard against the kind of form-
based adjudication that characterized US antitrust law in the 1950s and 1960s
and the early EU jurisprudence."
77 See Philip R. Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance 329, 352 (Sweet and Maxwell 2009);
World Bank, Finance and Private Sector Research (Bank Regulation and Supervision Database 2007),
online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/Banking.regulation_-.Survey-III_061008.xls (visited Oct 27, 2011) (compiling
data for 143 countries on domestic regulatory requirements for entry into banking sector by
domestic and foreign entities); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Progress Report on Basel III
Implementation (Oct 2011), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs203.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011)
(detailing domestic implementation of Basel rules on financial regulation).
78 For criticisms of the kind of form-based approach to vertical agreements adopted by the US
Supreme Court, in particular in the 1960s, see Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Poliy at
War with Itself 280-98 (Basic 1978); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U Chi L Rev 6 (1981).
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The adoption of effects-based analysis premised on economic learning,
however, does not mandate one approach or one outcome to cases. Contrary to
common belief, there need not be one single economic approach to competition
issues. There is a considerable range of issues over which mainstream
economists have disagreed, such as whether concentrated or competitive
markets are more conducive to innovation, the importance of predation and
entry deterrence, the impact of industry concentration on market performance,
and the meaning of the standard oligopoly models for real-world markets." This
Article lends full support to substantive convergence of a methodological kind,
in other words, to convergence with respect to the techniques used in economic
analysis. The ensuing discussion, however, questions whether substantive
convergence of a doctrinal kind, specifically, the harmonization of rules on the
legality of conduct, is advisable. As Budzinski has argued, the reliance on
economics does not necessitate such kind of convergence." What remains to be
explored is whether there are other economic or non-economic reasons
justifying such convergence.
A. Globalization and Convergence
Before turning to possible reasons for caution, we need to ask ourselves
several questions. Why should the competition laws of various jurisdictions
converge in the first place? What would be the harm if current efforts at
convergence stalled? Does the harm outweigh whatever possible benefits there
may be of maintaining regulatory diversity? Are there good reasons for retaining
regulatory diversity? As it turns out, the answers to these questions vary
somewhat according to the areas of competition law at issue.
The obvious justification for convergence is that it will help to minimize
instances of contradictory rules and decisions, which in turn will lower
compliance costs for firms operating in multiple jurisdictions. To some
79 See Budzinski, Governance of Global Competition at 108 (cited in note 31). Joseph Schumpeter and
Kenneth Arrow famously disagreed over whether a concentrated or a competitive market is more
conducive to innovation. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democray 87-120
(Harper Collins 2008); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Wefare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in Universities-Natl Bureau Committee for Econ Research, ed, The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 619-20 (Nad Bureau of Econ Research 1962). Harold
Demsetz also critiqued the structure-conduct-performance paradigm proposed by Joe Bain. See
Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of BeliefAbout Monopoly, in H.J. Goldschmid and J.F. Weston, eds,
Industrial Concentration: The New Learning 167-84 (Little, Brown 1974). See generally Joseph Bain,
Industrial OrganiZation (2d ed John Wiley 1968).
80 See Budzinski, Governance of Global Competiion at 108 (cited in note 31) ("However, any claim that
industrial economics would have provided a [sic] unambiguous manual to the 'right' competition
policy cannot be sustained-even if competition economics could been [sic] reduced to
theoretical industrial economics.").
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commentators, the convergence of competition law is a necessary consequence
of globalization." The argument is that globalization has eroded the boundaries
of national markets and has caused markets to become increasingly integrated, if
not outright global in reach.82 When firms and consumers are no longer
confined by national boundaries, any regulation of markets that is premised on
these boundaries becomes obsolete. Global markets with multinational
corporations as participants require a global competition law. This argument
seems highly convincing at first blush, and has been invoked in other areas of
law to justify international harmonization. However, it also runs the risk of
oversimplification. While it may be accurate to characterize markets as global if
both the buyers and the sellers are international in scope and transactions take
place across borders, the same characterization may not be accurate when
internationalization only happens on the seller's side.
Take commercial aircraft as an example. This market is generally
considered to be global in nature because there are only a few firms supplying
customers wherever they are located. In fact, it is largely a duopoly consisting of
Boeing and Airbus.83 The commercial customers are airline companies, which
are global in reach. In contrast, the market for consumer personal care products,
such as toothpaste and shampoo, has long been dominated by a handful of
multinational corporations, especially Unilever and Procter & Gamble.8 4 That
alone, however, does not render that market global. It is a well-known fact that
these products require a high degree of localization." What is considered an
attractive odor for shampoo in one country may be repulsive in another. The
buyer's side of the market for these products remains highly local in nature. It is
difficult to see why regulation of such a market should be internationally
81 See Barry J. Rodger, Competition Poky, liberaism and GlobafiZaion: A European Perspective, 6 Colum J
Eur L 289, 312-13 (2000); Gerber, Global Competition at 79-85 (cited in note 5). But see Eleanor
M. Fox, Economic Development, Povertj and Anitrust: The Other Path, 13 Sw J L & Trade Am 211,
216-220 (2007) ("Developing countries retort that antitrust for developing countries must also
address concerns of distribution and power. Developed countries rejoin that global efficiency
demands that laws converge, and laws should converge toward that of the developed world.").
82 See Rodger, 6 Colum J Eur L at 291-92 (cited in note 81). National competition authorities and
courts have found the relevant market to be global in quite a few cases, such as the Oracle-
PeopleSoft merger case. See United States v Oracle Corp, 331 F Supp 2d 1098, 1164 (ND Cal 2007).
83 See Richard Aboulafia, Airbus vs. Boeing: Year Four (Aerospace America Online Nov 2001), online
at http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=151&ArchivelssuelD=20 (visited Oct
24, 2011).
84 See Lee Ann Graul, et al, Procter & Gamble, Unilever and the Personal Products Industy (AMBA 607
Feb 2006).
85 See Peter Mouncey and Frank Wimmer, eds, Market Research Best Practice: 30 Visions for the Future
450-51 (Wiley 2009).
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harmonized simply because a few multinational corporations are the major
global producers.
Budzinski puts the argument most succinctly:
Internationalization and globalisation of markets do not imply that each
market becomes an international one in the course of time. With traditional
industries, a coexistence of national or more regional or local markets can
be observed, depending-among other things-on the characteristics of the
respective goods and services as well as on the preferences of consumers. It
is difficult to identify reasons why this would be different even in a fully
integrated world economy. 86
In other words, globalization does not imply the disappearance of local markets.
So long as such local markets exist, there remains a role for national competition
regimes to play and possible grounds for divergence among them. While
globalization may justify alignment of competition law rules that apply to truly
transnational business practices, it does not require the wholesale convergence
of national competition regimes. Convergence requires a more persuasive
justification than that.
Competition law is not the only area of business regulation that faces the
problem of cross-jurisdictional regulatory inconsistencies. Such inconsistencies
are a fact of life for multinational corporations and are present in most areas of
law. Corporation law, tax law, labor law, products liability law, securities
regulation, food and drug safety law, environmental law, and sector-specific
regulations for network industries are but a few examples. Compliance costs
would certainly be lower for multinational firms if all these areas of law were
harmonized. Firms would only need to produce one set of financial reports for
every jurisdiction in which they issue shares." They could use the same
employment contracts and adopt the same human resource policies. They could
avoid problems with double taxation. They could adopt the same content labels
for their food and drug products. And they would only need to comply with one
set of environmental regulations. These would no doubt be highly convenient
for multinational firms. Yet calls for harmonization in these areas of law are less
often heard than in competition law. For instance, Braithwaite and Drahos note
that corporation law is one of the areas of business regulation that has been
relatively free from efforts at harmonization." Therefore, it is worth pondering
whether competition law possesses any special attributes that render it
particularly suitable for or in need of convergence.
86 Budzinski, Governance of Global Competition at 13 (cited in note 31).
87 This is, to some extent, possible under current SEC regulations, which allow foreign issuers to use
the financial reports prepared for their home jurisdictions to meet SEC requirements.
88 See Braithwaite and Drahos, GlobalBusiness Reguladon at 167 (cited in note 56).
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B. A Proposed Analytical Framework
For the purpose of determining its suitability for harmonization, business
regulation can be classified by the subject matter of regulation. A regulation may
focus on a business entity, such as a bank or an insurance company; a product,
such as a food item or a pharmaceutical product; or a process, such as
manufacturing production or a securities issuance. There is, of course, overlap
between these categories. For example, securities regulation may be
characterized as regulation of shares as a product, as opposed to the issuance
process itself. Likewise, merger review can be plausibly characterized as either an
entity-based regulation or regulation of the merger process. The classification
exercise inevitably requires some judgment calls and ultimately depends on the
relative emphasis of the regulation. Merger review is more appropriately
classified as entity-based regulation as opposed to process-based regulation
because it is not focused on the corporate procedures governing a merger
transaction, but on the competitive effects exerted by the merged entity on the
relevant market. Securities regulation is more aptly described as process-based
regulation because it is primarily concerned with the process of issuing shares to
the public rather than the content of the shares themselves.
The reach of product-based and process-based regulations is usually
limited by the geographical area of a jurisdiction. These regulations rarely apply
if the product is not sold or the process does not take place within the
jurisdiction's territory, although extra-territorial application of regulations is on
the rise in some areas. 9 For instance, a jurisdiction's food and drug regulation
will only govern food and pharmaceutical products sold or manufactured within
its territory." In general, a jurisdiction's environmental standards will only apply
if a firm sells its products or operates in that jurisdiction."
The situation is slightly more complex for entity-based regulation. Entity-
based regulation may apply to any business entities that operate in its territory,
or only those that have established a nexus to the jurisdiction, such as through
89 One notable example of extra-territorial application of domestic regulation in recent years is the
UK Bribery Act, which applies to the corrupt practices of UK firms operating abroad. See Bribery
Act, 2010, c 23, § 6 (UK). Another area which has seen expansion of extra-territorial application is
anti-money laundering laws. See International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist
Financing Act of 2001, 18 USC §§ 301-03, 311-30, 351-66, 371-77 (2006).
90 See Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation at 386-87 (cited in note 56) (discussing
harmonization of national pharmaceutical regulatory regimes and regulatory competition among
regimes); id at 410-11 (referring to mutual recognition of national food regulations).
91 See Daniel Esty and Damien Geradin, Environmental Protection and International Competitiveness: A
Conceptual Framework, 32 J World Trade 5, 8-9 (1998). See also Joanne Scott, From Brussels with
Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory Attracon, 57 Am J of
Comp L 897, 921-22 (2009).
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business registration or incorporation. Corporation law generally only applies to
corporate entities that are incorporated within a jurisdiction.92 Meanwhile,
banking regulation, or at least some parts of it, will apply to any bank that
operates in it.
The case for harmonization ultimately comes down to a weighing of the
costs and benefits of convergence. The benefits of convergence are determined
by the possibility and costs of accommodating inconsistent regulations, which
this Article will call regulatory accommodation, by the regulated entity, which in
turn depends on the type of regulation at issue. By harmonizing inconsistent
regulations, convergence reduces or eliminates the need for regulatory
accommodation. The costs of regulatory accommodation are hence reduced or
eliminated. The costs of convergence are the loss of national regulatory
prerogative, which refers to the ability to design and enforce regulation
according to local needs and circumstances.
Let us first turn our attention to the benefits of convergence. The
possibility of regulatory accommodation varies by the type of regulation at issue.
Some types of regulation give firms considerable leeway to accommodate
regulatory inconsistencies, while others may not leave open such a possibility.
The easiest case is probably product-based regulations, which can be
accommodated by producing and labeling the products according to local
regulation. The possibility and ease of such accommodation is attested to by the
fact that it is regularly done by firms all over the world.
The ability of firms to accommodate inconsistent process-based
regulations depends on the portability of the process at issue. There are two
main types of processes undertaken by firms that may be the subject of
regulation: production and sales. Regulation of the sales process may in turn
focus on marketing, distribution, or other steps in the sales process. A
production process would be highly portable before a plant is built. When a firm
is still deciding the location of its production facility, it can choose the most
favorable regulatory regime. Regulatory competition among jurisdictions to
attract foreign direct investment is well documented.93 Therefore, at that stage,
inconsistent regulations are generally not a serious obstacle, and may, in fact,
present lucrative opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. A production process
becomes highly immobile once the manufacturing facility has been built. Firms
92 See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatog Competition Theory of Indeterminag in Corporate Law, 98 Colum L Rev
1098, 1098 (1998) (referring to jurisdiction-based limitations of corporate law and the ensuing
regulatory competition among the various states in the US).
93 See, for example Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competidon for Incorporaions, 94 Georgetown L J 1725 (2005);
Charles Oman, Polig Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competiton among Governments
to Attract FDI (OECD 2000).
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will have no choice but to comply with the local regulations. However, by then,
regulatory inconsistencies cease to be an issue for that facility; it complies with
one set of regulations. A manufacturing plant is usually only subject to the
regulations of the jurisdiction in which it is located. Regulatory inconsistencies
only become relevant at the firm-wide level.
If the process being regulated is a sales transaction, portability hinges on
the transferability of the transaction, which in turn is determined by the
geographical mobility of the buyer and the seller. Unsurprisingly, the mobility of
the buyer and the seller varies by the type of transaction at issue. For a securities
offering, the seller is generally highly mobile. A corporation can choose to list
itself in New York, London, Hong Kong, or practically anywhere else in the
world.9 4 Buyer mobility is constrained by the sophistication of the buyer and
government regulation. An institutional investor will have no trouble following
the issuer to another stock exchange." A retail investor will have greater
difficulty doing the same. However, even that may be changing with the advent
of new technology and the convenience of online trading. With more general
types of sales transaction, either the seller or, more likely, the buyer may have
little geographical mobility. For example, the sale of foodstuffs to retail
consumers is unlikely to be portable: the buyer is unlikely to travel long distances
for such goods." In that case, the firm may have little choice but to comply with
the local regulation.
The possibility of accommodating inconsistent entity-based regulations
depends on the coverage of the regulation, whether it covers the full entity or
only part of it. If a regulation applies to the entire firm, there is little room for
accommodating inconsistent regulations. If a regulation only applies to the local
subsidiary, and it is possible for different branches of the firm to comply with
different regulations, the situation is no different from that of process-based
regulation after a manufacturing facility has been constructed. While the local
94 See Howell E. Jackson and Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets:
Evidence from Europe-Part I, 3 Va L Bus Rev 207, 228 (2008) (analyzing reasons why European
issuers choose to gain access to the US capital markets); Erica Fung, Regulatory Competition in
International Capital Markets: Evidence from China in 2004-2005, 3 NYU J L & Bus 243, 290-96
(2007) (discussing Chinese issuers' choice of capital markets from among US, Hong Kong,
London, Japan, and Singapore).
95 Fung, 3 NYU J L & Bus at 296 (cited in note 94) ("Finally, an emerging theme from the
interviews was that US investors are becoming increasingly indifferent to where a company is
listed.... The fact is, US-based institutional investors do not limit their investments to shares
listed only on US exchanges... . Capital markets have become truly global, and this fundamental
change has dramatically altered the traditional fund raising practices of Chinese firms.")
96 The advent of the Internet and online websites has no doubt considerably enhanced the
geographical mobility of the buyer. Yet it remains possible for a local jurisdiction to regulate a
sales transaction between a domestic buyer and an online website.
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operation will have no choice but to comply with local regulation, regulatory
inconsistencies will only arise at the firm-wide level. These inconsistencies do
not render compliance impossible.
As should be obvious, the case for convergence is stronger if regulatory
accommodation is impossible. If mutually exclusive regulations from two
jurisdictions apply to the same firm simultaneously, there is a pressing need to
harmonize these regulations. This refers to full entity regulation. If
accommodation is possible, as in the case of the remaining types of regulation,
the desirability of convergence depends on the magnitude of accommodation
costs incurred by the firms and the mode of accommodation.
Within the subset of regulations for which regulatory accommodation is
possible, there are two modes of accommodation. The first mode of
accommodation is circumvention. Firms simply eschew less desirable regulatory
regimes in favor of more business-friendly ones. If the listing rules of a certain
jurisdiction are deemed to be too onerous, a firm can choose to list its shares
elsewhere. To the extent that other relevant factors such as the liquidity and
prestige of the alternative markets are comparable, firms can circumvent the
problem of regulatory inconsistencies by submitting to the most favorable
regime. This kind of forum shopping is only possible if the transaction process is
portable. Otherwise, firms are left with the only other mode of accommodation,
which is compliance. This is most likely to be the case with product-based
regulation. If a jurisdiction stipulates certain content or labeling requirements for
all beef products sold within it, a firm will have no choice but to comply with
these rules if it sells in that jurisdiction. Purchasers of beef are unlikely to be
sufficiently mobile to permit effective circumvention of that jurisdiction's
regulation by the seller.
The relationship between the mode of accommodation and
harmonization-whether ease of circumvention justifies more or less
harmonization-depends on the perspective one takes. From a firm's
perspective, easy circumvention probably renders regulatory inconsistencies a
less pressing issue. So long as the alternatives are comparable in most other
respects, a firm can choose the regulatory environment that best meets its
business needs. From a regulator's perspective, however, the possibility of forum
shopping lends support to harmonization. This is aptly illustrated by the US' and
the OECD's focus on money laundering." If one accepts that a particular
regulatory objective, such as combating money laundering, should be pursued
internationally, the ease of circumvention justifies upward harmonization of
97 The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs collaborates with the Financial Action Task Force, an
inter-governmental policymaking body, to harmonize anti-money laundering efforts. See OECD,
Tax Crmes and Money Laundeing, online at www.oecd.org/ctp/taxcrimes (visited Oct 24, 2011).
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relevant laws and efforts to eliminate havens for money laundering. Which
perspective dominates, it seems, would depend on the regulatory objective being
pursued. If the kind of conduct being targeted is clearly wrongful, such as money
laundering or bribery, the regulator's perspective tends to dominate. If the kind
of conduct being targeted is morally neutral or concerns a matter of national
importance, such as fiscal sovereignty, the regulator's desire for harmonization
may need to be balanced against other considerations. Political concerns may
interfere and prevent regulators from pursuing the optimal regulatory strategy.
With respect to regulation for which the mode of accommodation is
compliance, the desirability of harmonization comes down to a weighing of its
costs and benefits. The benefits are the potential savings of compliance costs
incurred by the firms. While such potential savings are to be welcomed, their
significance depends on the extent of globalization of the market at issue. To the
extent that a market is truly globalized, in the sense that both the buyer's and the
seller's sides of the market are internationally integrated, firms could realistically
adopt a uniform distribution and operational strategy across countries. Disparate
regulations are a genuine, or perhaps even the only, stumbling block to achieving
substantial transaction cost savings across countries. Meanwhile, for a non-
globalized market, firms will have to adopt localized business strategies anyway.
The potential savings from harmonization will be considerably smaller. The
justification for convergence is correspondingly less persuasive.
As mentioned earlier, the costs of harmonization include loss of the
regulatory prerogative of individual jurisdictions. Such loss may not impose
substantial costs, which would be the case when there is a single efficient
approach to regulation, or when what matters is not the merit, but the
uniformity, of regulation. An example would be the design for electric plugs and
sockets. While different designs may vary somewhat in their safety and other
performance features, the gains from a superior but inconsistent design are
dwarfed by the benefits of uniformity. Travelers across the world would save
much hassle and money if sockets and plugs in different countries were
standardized. Manufacturers could also avoid substantial costs by producing
electrical appliances with one type of plug. Aside from this subset of regulations,
however, there are myriad considerations that demand diversity in regulatory
approaches. The loss of national regulatory prerogative will be particularly costly
if these considerations bear on the effectiveness of the regulation or even the
general welfare of the jurisdiction. As will be illustrated below, this is likely to be
the case for competition law.
To sum up, the three types of regulation-entity-based, product-based, and
process-based regulations-present cases of varying strengths for
harmonization. Full entity regulation presents the most convincing case for
harmonization. Whether circumventable process-based regulation should be
harmonized depends on the regulatory objective being pursued. The remaining
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types of regulation-product-based regulation, non-circumventable process-
based regulation, and partial entity regulation-all leave firms only with the
option of compliance. Whether these types of regulation should be harmonized
boils down to a tradeoff between potential savings in compliance costs and the
importance of preserving national regulatory prerogative.
C. Harmonization and National Regulatory Prerogative
At this juncture, it may be worthwhile to explore the relationship between
harmonization and regulatory prerogative. The compatibility of harmonization
with the preservation of national regulatory prerogative depends on the number
of regulatory objectives implicated by an area of regulation. Most realms of
regulation pursue multiple and potentially conflicting regulatory objectives,
which entails a weighing of the objectives and a tradeoff between regulatory
costs and effectiveness. The fewer the regulatory objectives, the more likely it is
that different jurisdictions will arrive at a similar balance or tradeoff. Conversely,
the higher the number of regulatory objectives, the harder it is to reach a
consensus. Therefore, the multiplicity of regulatory objectives may render an
area of regulation unsuitable for harmonization; harmonization will entail the
imposition of a consensus in the face of justified diversity.
This can be illustrated by food safety regulation. Food safety has been
substantially harmonized on the global scale. The Codex Alimentarius
Commission in Rome has issued common standards for food safety that run
twenty-five volumes in three languages, including over two hundred standards,
forty codes and guidelines on a wide variety of issues related to food production,
packaging, and distribution." The Codex has received support from developed
and developing nations alike." Its standards have been adopted as references in
trade disputes within the WTO by the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, which was part of the 1993 Final Act of the Uruguay Round of
GATT negotiations. 00
A host of political, economic, and historical factors have contributed to the
success of the harmonization of food safety standards.o' This success, however,
is at least partly explained by the fact that food safety standards chiefly focus on
one regulatory objective: the protection of consumers from unsafe food
products. The relevant regulatory tradeoff is between ensuring the safety of food
products and keeping compliance costs by food producers and distributors
98 See Braithwaite and Drahos, GlobalBusiness Regulation at 401 (cited in note 56).
99 See id.
10 See id at 403.
101 See generally id at 399-417.
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manageable. Jurisdictions may disagree on the appropriate tradeoff, but their
differences are only a matter of degree. Meanwhile, the compromise will be
considerably more complicated if the relevant tradeoff involves multiple
regulatory objectives. Jurisdictions may accord different weights to the various
regulatory objectives, which in turn may affect how the tradeoff on regulatory
effectiveness is struck. Divergence in how countries choose to make this
tradeoff will obviously render the attainment of a global consensus considerably
more difficult, if not impossible.
D. Application of the Proposed Framework to Competition
Law
What does all this mean for the global convergence of competition law?
Does competition law present a convincing case for convergence? Various areas
of competition law need to be analyzed differently under the proposed
framework. Merger review is entity-based regulation. Even though it governs a
process-merger or acquisition-the ultimate outcome is a change in the
structure of business entities. The focus of the regulation is not on the process
of merger, but on the competitive impact of the merged entity on the relevant
markets. Whether merger review is partial or full entity regulation may depend
on the remedy being ordered. If a merger is being blocked, it affects the firms
concerned in their entirety. If only divestitures are ordered, the decision only
affects parts of the firms." 2 Divestiture orders imposed by different jurisdictions
may still conflict with each other. Given the possibility of an outright rejection
of a proposed transaction, merger review should be considered as full entity
regulation, which means that there is a strong case for convergence from the
perspective of regulatory accommodation.
The need to avoid conflicting merger review decisions, however, should
not be overstated. Here, it is again important to distinguish between genuinely
globalized markets and local markets. If a merger involves global markets, and
the competitive effects of the transaction are felt the same way in different
jurisdictions, there is a strong argument for a harmonized approach to merger
analysis and perhaps a single decision on the transaction. Assuming that these
jurisdictions pursue similar goals under their competition law-and this
assumption will be substantially qualified in subsequent sections-and their
competition authorities are analyzing the same transaction in the same market(s)
involving the same parties, conflicting decisions by different authorities are
indefensible.
102 See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 414 (ABA 6th ed 2007) ("[Where
only a portion of the merged assets raises competition concerns, a divestiture or injunction may
be confined to the assets related to the markets adversely affected.")
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This argument loses its force when the markets are not globalized and the
authorities are analyzing the effects of the merger on their respective national
markets. If a merger affects a particular national market in such a way that no
remedy can alleviate the competitive harm, the competition authority should
block the merger. While it may be frustrating for the proponents of a transaction
to abort a merger simply because one jurisdiction objects to it, if an informed
and well-supported economic analysis of the transaction demonstrates
irremediable anticompetitive effects in a local market, the desire for uniformity
cannot deny the local authority's prerogative to protect its own market and
consumers. Even for a full entity regulation, the argument for harmonization is
not absolute.
Regulation of restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance are both
concerned with business conduct. They focus on business-to-business
transactions and transactions with end consumers. They may restrict the
production or distribution of a product or service, but they generally do not go
directly to the content of the product or the substance of the service, as in the
case of drug safety standards, and are hence more appropriately considered as
process-based regulation.' Regulation of restrictive agreements and abuse of
dominance are not easily circumventable, if at all. The buyers in transactions
regulated by these two areas of competition law are usually not very
geographically mobile, at least not to a degree that permits forum shopping by
the sellers. Therefore, the only accommodation strategy for firms often is
compliance.
While some of the transactions regulated by these two areas of competition
law are global in scope, many of them are local in nature. International cartels,
which have almost become the mainstay of international competition law, are
often global in reach and involve firms from multiple continents. Meanwhile,
many vertical restraint and abuse of dominance cases are confined to national
markets. More importantly, to the extent that these types of practices are
pursued on a cross-border basis, they can be segregated in response to local
regulation. This segregability means that if jurisdictions were to have divergent
rules on one type of business conduct, say, resale price maintenance, it would be
possible for a multinational corporation to adjust its distribution policies to
accommodate the variations. It is hence possible for firms to accommodate
103 One may argue that competition rules on, say, standard setting amount to product-based
regulation, as they regulate technology standards that are incorporated in a product. However, it is
important to remember that competition law does not directly mandate or regulate the type of
technology standard adopted, but only how it is adopted. As such, it is still more appropriately
characterized as process-based regulation.
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regulatory inconsistencies, albeit with some costs. These costs could be saved if
competition law were harmonized internationally.
This is only half of the analysis, however. First, as suggested earlier, the
significance of these potential savings depends on the degree of the globalization
of the market at issue. If the relevant market is not genuinely globalized and
firms still pursue localized distribution and marketing strategies, the savings will
be less significant. Second, these savings will need to be balanced against the loss
of national regulatory prerogative. Here is where the analysis becomes more
complex. To the extent that one believes that competition law should only focus
on economic factors,' 04 and its analysis is only guided by one or two economic
goals, such as the maximization of economic efficiency or societal welfare of
some kind, and to the extent that there is a uniform understanding of the
meaning of these goals, one may expect jurisdictions to have relatively little
difficulty in reaching a consensus on the calibration of regulatory objectives. The
loss of national regulatory prerogative as a result of harmonization will not raise
serious concerns.
However, if these economic goals are in fact subject to different
interpretations, if these interpretations are dependent on the stage of economic
development and the socio-economic environment of the country at issue, if
competition law does pursue non-economic goals, or at least non-market-related
economic goals, if competition and markets are themselves not purely economic
constructs and are conditioned by cultural norms, and if the enforcement
infrastructure and general legal environment of a country is such that the rules
designed for other, more advanced, jurisdictions cannot be effectively and
impartially enforced in the local environment, then there are reasons to believe
that a consensus on the calibration of regulatory objectives will be difficult to
achieve. These possibilities suggest reasons to be concerned about the loss of
national regulatory prerogative and cautious about pursuing global convergence
of competition law.
V. DIVERGENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE GOALS OF
COMPETITION LAW
It was argued earlier that convergence would be more desirable and
feasible if there was an international consensus on the objectives of competition
law. As it turns out, such a consensus is lacking. There are disagreements as to
1o4 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law vii-viii (Chicago 2d ed 2001) (rejecting Michael
Jacobs's view that the conflict between Chicago and post-Chicago schools of antitrust is
ultimately a matter of political choice, while espousing the economic approach of the Chicago
School); Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Poigy at War with Itself at 134-160 (cited in note 78)
(analyzing various theories of harm in antitrust from an economic perspective).
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whether competition law should be a technocratic area of regulation that is
purely based on economic analysis,' or whether it should encompass other
non-market or even non-economic goals.10 ' Some scholars have argued that
there is an inherent political content in competition law that cannot be assumed
away simply by the incorporation of economic analysis. 07 Disagreement is not
confined to the goals pursued by competition law. It extends to the definition of
some of the fundamental concepts that serve as guideposts for competition law
analysis. These concepts include consumer welfare, total welfare, and even
competition itself.
Even if one were to subscribe to the notion that competition law should be
based entirely on economic theories, a technocratic conception of competition
law by no means necessitates convergence. Budzinski has argued that "there
neither is, nor can ever be, an ultimately 'right' competition theory."'0o There are
often a few credible approaches in mainstream economics to some of the most
controversial issues in competition law. In fact, he goes one step further and
argues that even if jurisdictions apply the same economic approach and adopt a
world welfare standard, they will arrive at divergent outcomes so long as there is
asymmetric distribution of consumers and producers in different countries.'09
What follows is an exploration of these sources of disagreement and their
implications for the drive for convergence.
A. Different Conceptions of Competition
It is a basic tenet of competition law that it protects competition and not
competitors."o The question that naturally follows is: What is competition?
Although both US and EU competition laws share the same professed goal of
protecting competition, it has been argued that the two jurisdictions understand
and apply the term differently. According to Professor Eleanor Fox, the US has
tended to focus on whether a particular business practice restricts output or
105 One of the leading proponents of this view is Professor Daniel Crane. See Daniel A. Crane,
Tecbnocracy andAntdtrust, 86 Tex L Rev 1159, 1160 (2008).
106 See Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Anitrust's Goals, 53 BC L Rev **63-65 (2012) (forthcoming),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904686## (visited Oct 24,
2011).
107 See, for example, Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U Pa L Rev 1051, 1051
(1979).
108 Budzinski, Governance of Global Competition at 105 n 51 (cited in note 31).
109 See id at 96.
110 This famous aphorism originated from the Brown Shoe case. Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US
294, 320 (1962). The US Supreme Court reiterated it again in Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat,
429 US 477 (1977), in which it said that antitrust laws "were enacted for the 'protection of
competition, not competitors."' 429 US at 487, quoting Brown Shoe, 370 US at 320.
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raises prices, that is, whether competition is harmed is generally measured by its
impact on allocative efficiency."' In the EU, competition is harmed when
"openness and access to markets on the merits" is impaired and the market
mechanism is degraded. 112 What constitutes harm to competition is potentially
broader under the EU definition than under the American one. What ultimately
accounts for this difference, she explains, is that there is greater faith in the
efficiency and benignancy of business conduct in the US." She believes that
both understandings of competition are consistent with the axiom that
competition law protects competition and not competitors. Which
understanding one adopts "is largely a matter of context and political economy
perspective."11 4
The most intuitive understanding of competition, perhaps, is that it refers
to the rivalry among firms to vie for consumers by offering lower prices and
better-quality products. Competition law protects competition under the belief
that rivalry among competitors drives progress in society. This belief in the
inherent merit of competition is the most entrenched in the US, especially
among the Chicago School scholars."' The focus on the preservation of rivalry
in the US is even more apparent when one compares the historical development
of merger review law across the Atlantic. For years, the US merger review
regime paid much closer attention to coordinated interaction than to unilateral
effects. As a matter of fact, the section on unilateral effects in the US Horizontal
Merger Guidelines was only added in 1992.11' Meanwhile, the EU has progressed
in the opposite direction: EU merger control traditionally has focused on
preventing the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Most of the
early EU merger cases were concerned with dominance resulting from a
merger."' It was only when the European Community Merger Regulation was
revised in 2004 that the substantive test became "significant impediment of
effective competition.""' The revision was made specifically to clarify that
coordinated effects can be a basis for prohibiting a merger under EU law.
Mii Eleanor M. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, 26 World Competition 149, 149
(2003).
112 Id at 150.
113 See id at 152-53.
114 Id at 150.
ils See, for example, Bork, The Antitrust Paradox A Polig at War with Itseff at 51 (cited in note 78);
Posner, Antitrust Law at vii-x (cited in note 104).
116 See Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects?, 12 Geo Mason L
Rev 31, 32 (2003).
117 A prime example is the Continental Can case. Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co v
Commission, Case 6/72, [1973] ECR 215.
11s Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 OJ (L 24) 7.
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This belief in the inherent merit of competition, however, is not universally
shared. Professor Ronald Dworkin has criticized then-Professor Richard
Posner's economic approach to the law, which espouses a belief in the markets,
wealth maximization, and the rationality of the individual as premised on "purely
'protestant' political values.""' Professor Wolfgang Pape asserts that "[t]he
concept of competition in the West is clearly linked to a certain degree of
individualism, egoism and striving for personal nealth-'values' which, although not
necessarily regarded as positive, are, according to the Western perception,
immanent traits of human beings."'2 0
This link between faith in competition and individualism has been affirmed
by cross-cultural psychologist Geert Hofstede in his famous multinational study
of cultural values in the late-1960s and early-1970s. Hofstede's surveys and
subsequent studies have repeatedly shown the US to be the most individualistic
country in the world.' 2 ' Countries that share similar faith in competition, mainly
other Anglo-Saxon countries, have also ranked highly on individualism.' 22
According to cross-cultural value surveys, the US and the other Anglo-Saxon
countries are clear outliers in their predilection for individualism. In light of the
demonstrated link between individualism and a preference for rivalry, there are
reasons to expect other countries not to share the same abiding faith in the
inherent merit of competition. This may be especially true of cultures that have
been traditionally known as collectivist.
Pape has carefully documented the different understandings of competition
in East Asian and Islamic cultures, and argued that these understandings
generally diverge from Western conceptions of competition. Regarding Japan,
Pape observes that the Japanese word for competition, kyoso, was only coined in
the nineteenth century and consists of two Chinese characters, kyo and so.123 The
first character stands for emulation and race, "whilst the second part 'so' . . .
carries the negative meaning of dispute, quarrel and conflict."12 4 According to
Pape, "the Meiji-regime originally opposed the introduction of this term, since it
did not reflect the traditional understanding of the harmony of 'wa', an old
119 Josef Drexl, On the (A)polidcal Character of the Economic Approach to Competition Law, in Josef Drexl,
Wolfgang Kerber, and Rupprecht Podszun, eds, Compeddon Polig and the Economic Approach:
Foundations and Limitations 312, 312 (Edward Elgar 2010).
120 Wolfgang Pape, Socio-CulturalDfferences and International Competition Law, 5 Eur LJ 438, 444 (1999).
121 See Geert Hofstede, National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-based Theoy of Cultural Differences
Among Nations, 8 Intl Studies Mgmt & Org 46, 52 (1983).
122 See id at 48-49, 52.
123 See Pape, 5 Eur LJ at 448 (cited in note 120).
124 Id.
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symbol for Japan."125 Regarding Islamic cultures, Pape notes that "egoism as an
extreme form of Western individualism and as a fundamental principle of
capitalism is alien to the Islamic tradition. The basic aim is not individual
performance, but being part of the community."12 6 Although competition is not
inconsistent with Islamic thinking, "extreme accumulation of private wealth and
power is forbidden."'127 Moreover, the Islamic concept of Zakaet, which "gives
those people who do not have the means to find a job or gain the necessary
education, a legal claim to other people's wealth,"128 may deter the drive for
profit by individual entrepreneurs.129
This discussion of the different attitudes toward competition is not meant
to suggest that firms in these countries do not compete. They very much do. It
is meant to illustrate that the belief in the inherent merit of competition may not
be universally shared. In countries that do not share this belief, competition is
generally considered a means to a higher end and not an end in itself. This
higher end may be consumer welfare, economic development, national
competitiveness, protection of employment, or other economic goals."' It may
be a combination of them. It even has been argued that fairness justifies the
protection of competition.' While these different conceptions of competition
may not produce marked variations in the application of competition law in
most cases, they do matter in the "hard" cases, where divergences between
jurisdictions are most likely. In cases where the preservation of rivalry directly
conflicts with the other goals of competition law, jurisdictions that hold
fostering rivalry to be the overriding goal of competition law may reach a
different outcome from that of jurisdictions that espouse a multiplicity of goals.
And it is in these cases where calls for convergence are the most vociferous.
In fact, one need not traverse between cultures and academic disciplines to
encounter different conceptions of competition. Even economists from
advanced jurisdictions have disagreed on its precise meaning and relevance. No
125 id.
126 Id at 452.
127 Pape, 5 Eur LJ at 453 (cited in note 120).
128 Id at 452.
129 Id at 453.
130 For instance, German merger laws provide for an international competitiveness defense, which
may be granted by the relevant minister. See Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Germany, in Edward M. Graham and
J. David Richardson, eds, Global Competition Pofig 115, 133-35 (Peterson 1997). Canadian
competition law provides for a similar defense under Section 96 of the Canadian Competition Act
RSC, C-34 (1985) (Can).
131 See Daniel Zimmer, Consumer Weare, Economic Freedom and the Moral Quahty of Competition Lan-
Comments on Gregor Werden and Victor Vanberg, in Drexl, Kerber, and Podszun, eds, Competition
Polig at 77 (cited in note 119).
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less than Gregory Werden, Senior Economic Counsel in the Antitrust Division
of the US Department of Justice, has argued that "the word 'competition' is not
understood to mean 'rivalry', but the product of it."' 3 2 The implication is that
competition is worth protecting not as a process, but for the benefits it brings.
Other economists have posited negative externalities to competition, such as
excessive entry costs and excessive product differentiation, which is particularly
serious in oligopolistic markets featuring differentiated products."' Compared to
the neoclassical economists, the Ordoliberals from the Freiburg School are even
more circumspect about unfettered competition. The Ordoliberals are
concerned by the "'inherent self-destructive tendency within competition ...
Ordoliberals are more sensitive to the political power of large companies ...
[and] have other goals apart from that of the efficient allocation of
resources."' 3 4 Thus while the Chicago School scholars firmly believe in the
inherent merit of inter-firm rivalry, which has largely become the orthodoxy in
competition law, this belief is not shared by all economists and certainly not by
all cultures.
B. Consumer Welfare Versus Total Welfare
The disagreement is not confined to whether the competitive process
should be protected in its own right. Consensus on whether consumer welfare
or total welfare should be the relevant standard for analysis is equally elusive. In
fact, commentators cannot even agree on the meaning of "consumer welfare."
While there is general agreement on what a total welfare standard attempts
to maximize, namely, total surplus,' 35 the definition of consumer welfare is
shrouded in controversy.'36 Even if one agrees that consumer welfare is only
confined to the economic concept of consumer surplus, there is the obvious
question of who constitutes the consumers whose surplus is protected. Some
argue that consumers should only include end consumers, while others, such as
132 Gregory J. Werden, Consumer Welfare and Competition Polig, in Drexl, Kerber, and Podszun, eds,
Competiion Pokg at 20 (cited in note 119).
133 See Kenneth Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analsis: Why not the Best?, Economic Analysis
Group Discussion Paper 06-8, *21 (2006), online at http://ssm.com/abstract=959454 (visited
Oct 29, 2011).
'34 Rodger, 6 Colum J Eur L at 294 & n 23 (cited in note 81), quoting Heinz G. Grosskettler, On
Designing an Economic Order: The Contribution of the Freiburg School, in Donald A. Walker, ed,
Perspectives on the History of Economic Thought Volume II, Twentieth Century Economic Thought 59 (Edward
Elgar 1989).
'35 Heyer, Welfare Standards at *11 (cited in note 133).
136 To muddy the water further, Robert Bork has confusingly advocated a total welfare standard
under the appellation of consumer welfare. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox at 107-15 (cited in note
78).
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Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, believe that customers of all kinds should count
as consumers under the consumer welfare standard.' It has been argued that
under the former formulation of consumer welfare, a buyer cartel would be
unobjectionable so long as the downstream retail market is competitive and the
end consumers are unharmed." 8 Those who find unpalatable the prospect of
buyer cartels being upheld either argue that these cartels should be singled out
for special condemnation even if consumer welfare only encompasses end
consumers or that consumer welfare extends to intermediate customers as well.
Beyond the disagreement about definition, the relative merits of consumer
welfare versus total welfare remain unresolved. Professor Dennis Carlton
believes that total welfare is a superior standard for competition law analysis for
a number of reasons. First, the consumer welfare standard tends to undervalue
dynamic efficiency gains by overemphasizing short-run price reductions."'
Second, using the consumer welfare standard as a means of wealth redistribution
is misleading because most competition law cases involve disputes between
firms, and firm profits flow back to consumers in the form of dividends.'"
Finally, Carlton argues that buyer cartels and monopsony power should raise no
competitive concerns under a true consumer welfare standard. 141 Carlton's
preference for the total welfare standard is shared by none other than Nobel
Laureate Oliver Williamson, who, in a famous 1968 article, forcefully argues in
favor of a total welfare standard for merger review.142
Russell Pittman of the US Department of Justice rejects the total welfare
standard for merger review, arguing that such a standard will inevitably carry a
systemic bias for producer surplus.143 He also questions the validity of a
common rejoinder by proponents of the total welfare standard that any bias for
firms inherent in such a standard can be offset by transfer payments and other
government policies.'" Pittman argues that until effective government policy is
in place to address the severe income inequality that afflicts most nations, "it
137 See Werden, Consumer Welfare at 39 (cited in note 132); Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to
Be Modernized?, 21 J Econ Perspectives 155, 165 (2007).
138 See Carlton, 21 J Econ Perspectives at 158 (cited in note 137).
139 See id at 157.
140 See id at 158.
141 See id.
142 See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeof, 58 Am Econ Rev
18 (1968).
143 Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement *1 (US DOJ
Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 07-9 2007), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=996643 (visited Oct 29, 2011).
144 See id at *5.
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seems quite reasonable to argue that those making and enforcing other public
policies, like antitrust enforcement, should, to the degree manageable, take into
account the distributional implications of their actions."1 45
The debate is further complicated when one moves beyond the theoretical
merits of the two standards to implementation issues. Professors Damien Neven
and Lars-Hendrik R6ller conclude that a consumer welfare standard is generally
superior for merger review purposes when lobbying by business interests is
efficient and agency accountability low.'" This observation is echoed by
Carlton.147 Professors David Besanko and Daniel Spiilber similarly came out in
favor of the consumer welfare standard, mostly on the grounds of the
information asymmetry between the enforcement agency and the firms.'48
The unresolved debate about the relative merits of the two welfare
standards casts doubt on the feasibility of convergence across the globe. The
emerging jurisdictions may rightfully question which standard they should adopt
when the established jurisdictions themselves cannot reach a consensus. This is
evidenced by Werden's observation that the 1992 US Horizontal Merger
Guidelines seem to have left the issue of welfare standard intentionally vague.14
This vagueness persists despite the common belief that US antitrust law
generally espouses the consumer welfare standard.'
The choice of welfare standard may have critical implications for
developing countries, and it may incorporate different considerations from those
facing developed nations. In developing countries, small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) often play a pivotal role in alleviating poverty. There is a
strong argument that surplus redounding to these firms should be given weight
by their competition laws, which militates in favor of a total welfare standard.
Meanwhile, given that many of the consumers in developing countries, especially
those in markets for foodstuffs and other basic necessities, are likely to be poor,
their welfare deserves extra protection. If Pittman is right in saying that there is
an inherent pro-business bias in a total welfare standard, developing countries
may better serve their citizens' interests by adopting a consumer welfare
145 Id at *5. See also generally Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A Consumer Surplus Defense in MeTer Control, in
Johan Stennek, ed, Contributions to Economic Analysis 287 (Emerald 2007).
146 See generally Damien J. Neven and Lars-Hendrik Roller, Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a
PolticalEconomy Model of Merger Control, 23 Intl J Indust Org 829 (2005).
147 See Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to be ModerniZed? at 159 (cited in note 137).
148 See Fridolfsson, A Consumer Surplus Defense at 9 (cited in note 145).
149 See Werden, Consumer Welfare at 21 (cited in note 132).
150 See Herbert Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Pokcy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 77 (West 3d
ed 2005) ("Antitrust analysts commonly use a substitute, the 'consumer welfare' principle. Many
people who probably believe that maximizing allocative efficiency should be the exclusive goal of
antitrust, state that the goal of antitrust should be to maximize the welfare of consumers.").
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standard. A full investigation of the appropriate welfare standard for developing
countries is beyond the scope of this Article. In light of the continual
disagreement within the established jurisdictions about the appropriate welfare
standard, and the special considerations facing developing countries in making
the choice, there is little reason to expect jurisdictions to converge on a common
welfare standard in the foreseeable future.
C. Competition Law as Technocratic Regulation
A more fundamental disagreement concerns whether competition law is a
technocratic area of regulation that is purely concerned with economic issues or
whether it encompasses non-economic goals. Under the technocratic view of
competition law, competition law is about microeconomic issues presented by
the relevant markets at issue. Competition law cases are decided based on the
market effects of a business practice according to some benchmark for
economic performance, such as economic efficiency or some measure of societal
welfare."'
This is by no means the only possible or plausible conception of
competition law. Even if one accepts that competition law is concerned with
economics, it need not be confined to microeconomic issues. For instance, the
competition law of some jurisdictions, such as Canada and South Africa,
explicitly requires effects on employment and national competitiveness to be
taken into account.s 2 Employment and national competitiveness are excluded
from the purview of competition law in the technocratic tradition, but are
nonetheless important macroeconomic objectives. Different jurisdictions may
have divergent expectations about what economic goals should be served by
their competition laws. Those that do not consider competition as an end worth
protecting in its own right are more likely to incorporate non-market related
goals in their competition laws. These divergent expectations are reflected in the
ICN's Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of
Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies, which lists the
following as the objectives of unilateral conduct laws of ICN member
jurisdictions: "ensure effective competitive process as a goal and/or a means,
promote consumer welfare, maximize efficiency, ensure economic freedom,
151 See Paul S. Crampton, Alternative Approaches to Competition Law, 17 World Competition 55, 85
(1994). See generally Fredbric Jenny, Competition and Effidency, in Barry E. Hawk, ed, Annual
Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute:Antitrustin a GlobalEconomy 185 (Turis Pub 1997).
152 Article 2 of the South African Competition Act states the promotion of employment and
expansion of opportunities for South African participation in world markets as some of the
purposes of the Act. Competition Act (RCL 1999) (S Africa). Section 1.1 of the Canadian
Competition Act similarly states the expansion of opportunities for Canadian participation in
world markets as a purpose of the Act. Canadian Competition Act RSC, C-34, § 1.1 (1985) (Can).
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ensure a level playing field for SMEs, promote fairness and equality, promote
consumer choice, achieve market integration, facilitate privatization and market
liberalization, and promote international competitiveness."153 Most of these
goals are deemed unacceptable by the technocratic tradition of competition law,
yet numerous jurisdictions pursue them in their abuse of dominance laws.
Beyond economic goals, some commentators have argued that there is an
inherent political content in competition law and believe that competition law
may properly pursue political and social goals. For instance, Professor Barry
Rodger asserts that "competition law is not necessarily solely concerned with the
fulfillment of economic ideals;" politics and economics "have played [a
significant role] in the formation of competition policy." 15 4 He proceeds to
enumerate a number of political objectives that may be pursued by competition
law, including the control of the excessive concentration of economic power,
regional policy, and market integration, which is particularly relevant to the
EU.'"' One important non-economic goal pursued by EU competition law is
market integration. The European courts' hostility toward vertical territorial
restrictions and ban on parallel imports can be best understood from the
perspective of fostering the internal market.1 6 While market integration may be
viewed as an economic policy in general, in the European context, it is intimately
related to the political integration of the EU that began as an attempt to prevent
the European nations from descending into a self-destructive war again. Market
integration is thus as much a political as an economic enterprise in Europe.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Professor Robert Pitofsky, former
Chairman of the US FTC, famously asserted that "[i]t is bad history, bad policy,
and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust
laws."' These political values include the antidemocratic political impulses that
may result from an excessive economic concentration of power and the pressure
on the state to play a more intrusive role in the economic affairs of an economy
dominated by a few giants.' The US Supreme Court has voiced a similar
concern about the political ramifications of anticompetitive conduct. It has
153 ICN, Unilateral Conduct Working Groub, Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of
Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies *93 (Report presented at the 6th
Annual Conference of the ICN 2007), online at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf (visited Oct 29,
2011).
15 Rodger, 6 Colum J Eur L at 302 (cited in note 81).
155 Id at 304.
156 See, for example, Consten and Grundig v Commission, Cases 56 and 58/64, [1966] ECR 299;
AstraZeneca v Commission, Case T-321/05, 2010 OJ 33-34.
157 Pitofsky, 127 U Pa L Rev at 1051 (cited in note 107).
158 See id at 1075.
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justified the protection of the competitive process with political and social
values, noting in the Northern Pafic case that:
[t]he Sherman Act ... rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction
of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. 59
Consideration of broader economic and non-economic goals does not
require the wholesale displacement of market-related goals from competition
law. This Article in no way argues that competition law should be preoccupied
with broader economic and non-economic goals. Ensuring employment or
promoting national competitiveness should not be the primary foci of
competition law, nor should competition law be principally concerned with
fairness or the broader political implications of economic concentration. The
main concerns of competition law should be the protection of the competitive
process and the enhancement of societal welfare. Being the chief focus,
however, does not require being the exclusive focus. Non-market-related goals
may have a role to play on the margin. In cases where the arguments based on
welfare or efficiency are close, there is room for considering these secondary
goals. In other words, these secondary goals could be treated as tiebreakers in
close cases.'" Some jurisdictions choose to exclude these secondary goals
entirely, while some adopt a broader conception of the goals of their
competition laws. Within the latter group, each jurisdiction may accord different
weights to these broader non-market goals. There is no one correct approach.
This multitude of possible approaches poses a serious dilemma for convergence.
It increases the costs resulting from the loss of national regulatory prerogative by
reducing the ability of jurisdictions to ascertain the correct balance of goals for
themselves, thus rendering it less likely that the benefits of convergence will
outweigh its costs.
D. Implications for Convergence
What are the implications of the foregoing discussion for convergence?
There is little salience for procedural convergence, at least concerning what has
been contemplated thus far, namely, the procedures for merger review. The
159 Northern Pacfic Railway Co v United States, 356 US 1, 15 (1958).
160 The existence of multiple goals to be taken into account will increase the discretion given to
competition authorities and legal uncertainty. There is the obvious question of how the authority
will prioritize the various goals. One possible way to deal with this problem is to have the
legislature specify the relative importance of different goals in the legislation. This will impose
some structure on the prioritization of the goals and avoid giving excessive discretion to the
authority.
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implication for substantive convergence, however, is clear. If countries attribute
different goals, some economic and some non-economic, to competition law,
and there is no consensus on the scope and relative weight of each of these
goals, substantive convergence will be difficult to achieve.
A country that does not share the belief in the inherent merit of
competition and is instead more concerned with the excessive concentration of
economic power will pay less attention to collusive conduct and focus more on
abuses of dominance. A jurisdiction that adopts a total welfare standard on the
grounds that its producers are equally worthy of protection as its consumers,
especially in markets where the producers are drawn from the underprivileged
classes in society, will decide a potentially anticompetitive merger with promises
of considerable efficiency gains differently from a jurisdiction applying the
consumer welfare standard. A jurisdiction espousing the consumer welfare
standard may show relative leniency to buyer cartels and monopsonists so long
as the end consumers are unharmed. Different conceptions about competition,
the appropriate welfare standards and their applications, and the permissible
scope of non-market goals in competition law may result in substantive
divergences.
With respect to normative convergence, disagreement on these issues itself
constitutes normative disagreement. Whether competition is inherently
beneficial, whether producers' interests deserve protection, whether competition
law should pursue distributive goals, and whether competition law should be
concerned about excessive accumulation of economic power are themselves
normative issues, each of which bears on competition law enforcement. It was
asserted earlier that law must not be detached from the social and cultural norms
of a jurisdiction, lest it lose legitimacy."' To the extent that the diversity of goals
contained in competition laws across the globe reflects the prevailing social and
cultural norms about competition in the various jurisdictions, there exist
significant normative divergences, which in turn render substantive convergence
difficult to achieve.
VI. DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONVERGENCE
The discussion thus far has largely focused on established jurisdictions. It is
argued that disparate views on the goals of competition law pose great obstacles
to convergence. Global consensus becomes even more elusive once developing
countries are brought into the picture. Policy goals that are particularly relevant
to these countries include economic development, poverty reduction, and
inclusive growth-growth that benefits not only the elite but also the general
161 See Section I .A.
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population. These are goals that have not been given particular priority in the
industrialized nations and have not been explicitly incorporated into their
approaches to competition law. The different economic environment in
developing countries-such as the lack of market dynamism; the prevalence of
corruption and cronyism; the need to offer assistance to SMEs, which hold the
key to poverty alleviation; the prominence of the informal economy; and the
lack of innovative capacity-may call for different emphases in competition law
analysis from that of industrialized nations.
A. Special Characteristics of Developing Economies
Serious poverty and income inequality are prevalent in many developing
economies. These phenomena present two main challenges to developing
countries as far as competition law enforcement is concerned. One is the need
to encourage entrepreneurship to promote inclusive growth; the other is the
need to protect impoverished consumers from exploitative practices. A number
of commentators, including Fox, have argued that developing countries must
pursue inclusive growth that will alleviate poverty and reduce income
inequality.162 Inclusive growth requires opportunities for upward economic
mobility, an important avenue for which is entrepreneurship.'63 For those who
are at the bottom of the economic ladder in a developing country, often the only
way to break out of poverty is to start their own businesses, which are going to
be, at least initially, SMEs. Therefore, encouragement of entrepreneurship and
assistance to SMEs must be a central pillar in every inclusive growth strategy. If
competition law is to complement an inclusive growth strategy, it must afford
SMEs stronger protection than is customary in established jurisdictions and be
particularly vigilant against abuse of dominance. This is especially so because
dominant firms in developing countries are often former state monopolies that
still benefit from official patronage or informal connections to the state. Their
privileged positions make it even harder for new private firm rivals to compete
with them.
162 See Fox, 13 Sw J L & Trade Am at 216-20 (cited in note 81).
163 See Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillen, Entrepreneurshp and Firm Formation Acrss
Countries *2 (World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshots Feb 2008), online at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/475459-
1222364030476/FirmFormation NBER.pdf (visited Oct 25, 2011); Inter-American Development
Bank, Private Sector Development Strategy *4 (March 12, 2004), online at
www.iadb.org/document.cfm?id=352366 (visited Oct 25, 2011); United Nations Development
Programme, Unleashing Entrepreneurship **5-9 (March 1, 2004), online at
www.undp.org/cpsd/documents/report/english/ fullreport.pdf_(visited Oct 25, 2011).
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The poorest in many developing countries live below the poverty line and
often scrape by with no more than a dollar or two a day.'64 They are often
malnourished, sick, and illiterate, which severely curtails their productivity and
ability to improve their economic well-being. Therefore, an inclusive growth
strategy must include policies to combat malnourishment, poor health, and
illiteracy. While the bulk of the responsibility will fall on government programs
that directly confront these problems, competition law has a role to play.
Competition law enforcement may focus on goods that have the most direct
impact on the nutritional, health, and educational needs of the poorest in
developing countries. Anticompetitive conduct in these sectors should be dealt
with harshly.
Beyond that, developing country competition authorities may consider
taking a tougher stance on exploitative practices by dominant firms. This is
despite the fact that most established jurisdictions, especially the US, have largely
left exploitative practices out of the purview of competition law."' The usual
justification for this stance is two-fold. First, there is a serious implementation
problem of distinguishing between very high prices and excessive prices.'6 6 Such
distinctions are notoriously difficult to draw. The inability to do so undermines
effective enforcement and legal certainty for firms seeking to comply with the
law. Second, there is the theoretical objection that the opportunity to reap
temporary monopoly profit spurs firms to compete and innovate.'6 1 In the
industrialized nations, the general view is that consumers are able to bear
momentary high prices, which will be eroded once a new competitor enters the
market. Short-run monopolistic prices are the price that consumers pay for the
benefit of keener long-run competition and innovation. While consumers in
developed nations may be in a position to withstand such high prices, the
poorest consumers in developing countries are not. Any extra cost for a basic
necessity will have a direct and severe impact on their overall standard of living.
For example, 10 percent more spent on foodstuffs may require consumers to
164 See World Bank, Extreme Poverty Rates Continue to Fall (June 2, 2010), online at
http://data.worldbank.org/news/extreme-poverty-rates-continue-to-fall (visited Oct 5, 2011).
165 See Veri.on Comm Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 407 (2004); Berkey Photo,
Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, 603 F2d 263, 296 (2d Cir 1979).
166 See Michal S. Gal, Monopoy Pring as an Antitrust Offense in the US and the EC Two Sjstems of Belief
about Monopof?, 49 Antitrust Bull 343, 367, 373-74 (2004).
167 Trinko, 540 US at 407 ("The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging
of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market
system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts
'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth.").
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remove their children from school."' The plight of these consumers therefore
may justify a more assertive stance on exploitative practices in markets for basic
necessities.
Dynamic markets are less likely to be found in developing countries than in
industrialized nations. Most sectors of developing country economies are
dominated by a handful of firms."' The lack of a well-functioning capital
market, which is the case in many developing countries, means that new entrants
may have difficulty in obtaining financing. 70 The dearth of skilled human capital
may constrain a new firm's ability to establish itself and compete. Rapid market
entry is hence by no means assured. Even if a new firm successfully establishes a
foothold in the market, it may be no match for the well-funded and well-
connected incumbent firms. This means that Justice Scalia's pronouncement in
Veri7on Comm Inc v Law Offices of Curtis . Trinko, LLP,'7 1 that temporary
monopoly profit could be beneficial because it attracts new market entrants and
entrepreneurial activities, rings hollow in developing countries. 7 2 There may be
no market entry in response to the existence of monopolistic profit. This lack of
market dynamism has important implications for regulating abuse of dominance
in developing countries. It calls for a more aggressive abuse of dominance
enforcement agenda. The dearth of potential market entrants means that
incumbents will have greater incentive to harm existing rivals, as the payoff will
be substantial after existing rivals are eliminated. It also means that it is more
important to protect these competitors, as they are vital, perhaps even
indispensable, to keeping the market competitive. 13
Most developing countries possess little of what development economists
call innovative capacity: the ability to come up with novel products or
production processes.17 4 Most of them possess no more than imitative capacity,
168 For example, in Nepal, households that have experienced food price increases over the last three
months were most likely to use education-related coping mechanisms, with 14 percent taking their
children out of school for work. See UNICEF, Department of Education, and Research Input
and Development Action, 3F Crisis: Impact on Education, Quarterly Monitoring Report *1 (uly-
Sept 2009).
169 See James Tybout, Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why?, 38 J
Econ Lit 1, 16 (2000); Philippe Brusick and Simon J. Evenett, Should Developing Countries Worry
about Abuse of Dominant Power?, 2008 Wis L Rev 269, 276 (2008).
170 Thorsten Beck and Asil Demirguc-Kunt, Access to Finance: An Unfinished Agenda, 22 World Bank
Econ Rev 3 (2008); Brusick and Evenett, 208 Wis L Rev at 276 (cited in note 169); Tybout, 38 J
Econ Lit at 6 (cited in note 169).
17' 540 US 398 (2004).
172 See id at 402.
173 See Fox, 26 World Competition at 163-64 (cited in note 111).
174 For application of the concepts of innovative and imitative capacities, see Edwin Lai, International
Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Rate of Product Innovation, 55 J Dev Econ 133 (1998);
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that is, the ability to imitate a technology that has been invented elsewhere,
usually a developed country."' The lack of innovative capacity means that the
social calculus behind the grant of patent protection needs to be recalibrated. If
there are no inventors to take advantage of the innovation incentives offered by
the patent system, competition law rules on intellectual property exploitation
need not be as deferential to the preservation of innovation incentives as their
developed country counterparts. This is a crucial qualification to the patent-
competition interface because the need to preserve innovation incentives is the
most forceful argument offered to defend potentially anticompetitive patent
exploitation practices in developed nations. This means that developing
countries may have greater leeway in regulating these practices.
Many developing countries have pursued industrial policy as a growth
strategy. There has been much academic discussion about the merits of such
policy. Some notable commentators, such as Professors Michael Porter and
Simon Evenett, have cast serious doubt on the efficacy of industrial policy, while
others take a more sanguine view of it."' This Article does not attempt to
resolve the debate. Instead, it focuses on the ramifications of industrial policy on
competition law enforcement. To the extent that industrial policy is in place,
competition law analysis needs to take into account how such policy distorts the
competitive dynamics of the markets."' This may require adjustment in
enforcement priority or even legal principles.
Lastly, one must give explicit recognition to the political environment and
resource limitations facing many developing countries. As mentioned earlier,
many developing countries are afflicted by serious corruption and cronyism. The
independence and reliability of their competition law enforcement infrastructure
cannot be taken for granted. Even if the officials were honest and independent
in their application of the law, they may face serious limitations in their
resources and expertise. Many of them have not received extensive training in
Carmelo Pierpaolo Parello, A North-South Model of Intellectual Propery Rights Protection and Skill
Accumulation, 85 J Dev Econ 253 (2008). The relative strength of industrialized nations in research
and development (R&D) and innovation is attested to by the fact that they account for a vast
majority of global R&D expenditure. Developing countries only contributed 24 percent of the
global R&D expenditure in 2007. If China is excluded, the figure drops to 14.8 percent. See
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Global Investments in R&D, 15 UIS Fact Sheet 3 (2011).
175 See Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WFrO and Developing Countries at 5 (cited in note 64).
176 See Simon J. Evenett, Lessons From the Six County Analyses, in Brooks and Evenett, eds, Competition
Polcy and Development in Asia (MacMillan 2005); Michael E. Porter, Competition and Anitrust: A
Producivity Based Approach 339, 346-49 (2002), online at
http://www.isc.hbs.edu/053002antitrust.pdf (visited Nov 11, 2011).
177 For an overview of industrial policy in general, see Maroi Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, and Joseph E.
Stiglitz, eds, Industrial Poliy and Development: The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation (Oxford
2009).
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competition law and industrial organization economics."' Even if the
enforcement authority possesses the expertise, the judiciary most likely does
not."' This greatly limits the sophistication of the analysis that can be
incorporated into the competition law regimes of developing countries.
B. Implications for Convergence
The important question, again, is: What are the implications of these
economic and political characteristics of developing countries for the
convergence of competition law? The implications for procedural and normative
convergences are likely to be limited.8 o The relevance for substantive
convergence, however, is immense. On a more general level, if developing
countries are to take poverty alleviation and the pursuit of inclusive growth
seriously, they may need to adopt a more interventionist approach to
competition law enforcement than has been practiced in established
jurisdictions. Fox and Rodger have both noted that a non-interventionist
enforcement approach generally preserves the existing distribution of wealth and
economic structure.'"' This is obviously undesirable for developing countries,
many of which have deleteriously unequal wealth distribution.' 82
The lack of expertise, experience, and resources in the enforcement
infrastructure means that bright-line rules, as opposed to nuanced rule of reason
analysis, may be more appropriate.183 This may reduce the range of analytical
options at the disposal of the enforcement authority when tackling a
competition law issue. For instance, a per se approach for resale price
maintenance may be more suitable for developing countries. While the majority
in Leegin forcefully argued that RPMs are procompetitive in a sufficient number
178 See Brusick and Evenett, 2008 Wis L Rev at 293 (cited in note 169).
1' See id at 279-80.
180 These characteristics are unlikely to have much relevance for the harmonization of merger review
procedures. Their relevance may be greater for procedural convergence in other areas of
competition law, especially the relative lack of expertise and resources in the enforcement
infrastructure.
181 See Rodger, 6 ColumJ Eur L at 297 (cited in note 81); Fox, 13 Sw J L & Trade Am at 215 (cited
in note 81).
182 See Xubei Luo and Nong Zhu, Rising Income Inequality in China: A Race to the Top **3, 7 (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4700 Aug 2008), online at
http://libraryl.nida.ac.th/worldbankf/fulltext/wps04700.pdf (visited Oct 30, 2011) (analyzing
increasing income inequality in China in recent years); J. Humberto Lopez and Guillermo Perry,
Inequaity in Latin America: Determinants and Consequences (World Bank Policy Research Paper 4504
Feb 2008), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1090391 (visited Nov
6, 2011) (reviewing causes for income inequality in Latin America).
183 See Fox, 13 SwJ L & Trade Am at 230 (cited in note 81).
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of instances that per se treatment is not appropriate,' most developing
countries do not have the resources to devote to the investigation and analysis of
every instance of RPM. If a sufficient proportion of RPMs is anticompetitive,
such jurisdictions should opt for a per se rule.
The choice of welfare standard in merger review may similarly need to be
adjusted. To the extent that the authority's independence is in doubt, Neven and
Roller have argued that a consumer welfare standard will be more appropriate.'
This is because the pro-consumer bias of the standard will counteract the
effective lobbying by business interests, thereby creating a more balanced
outcome. Market dynamism also affects the choice of welfare standard in merger
review. Professor Bruce Lyons has demonstrated that a consumer welfare
standard is generally preferable only when the market is large and there are
alternative efficiency-enhancing mergers available in the market. He notes that
"[i]f there are only two firms, the [total welfare standard] is always superior
because the proposed merger has no alternatives.""' The relative weight of these
considerations is likely to vary by country, or perhaps even by market.'
The characteristics of developing countries require adjustments to specific
competition law doctrines and principles. While it may be argued that these
characteristics can be adequately taken into account by shifting enforcement
priorities, only doctrinal changes can adequately reflect these characteristics.
Take the patent-competition interface as an example. The lack of innovative
capacity in a developing country means that patent competition law rules need to
pay much less attention to innovation incentives, and there are much weaker
reasons to incur short-term consumer welfare loss to generate these incentives.
More concretely, this may mean that unilateral refusal to license is more
susceptible to challenges in developing countries than in developed nations. This
may be especially so if the product at issue is a basic necessity, the access to
which significantly contributes to poverty alleviation and improved well-being of
the poor. A more interventionist approach to unilateral refusal to license
intellectual property would not be possible with a mere adjustment in
enforcement priorities. It would require a doctrinal shift that may preclude
substantive convergence on this prominent issue in competition law.
184 See Leegin, 551 US at 886-907.
185 See Neven and R6ler, 23 Intl J Indust Org at 831 (cited in note 146).
186 Bruce R. Lyons, Could Politidans Be More Right than Economists? A Theory of Merger Standards *21
(Revised CCR Working Paper 02-1 2002), online at www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly-fs/1.104451!ccr02-
1revised.pdf (visited Nov 6, 2011).
187 The choice of a different welfare standard depending on the number of firms in the market is
unlikely to be feasible and will be open to criticisms on fairness concerns. Therefore, developing
countries are likely to be required to take market dynamism into account by examining their
domestic markets on an aggregate basis.
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Another possible divergence from the established jurisdictions is more
robust enforcement against abuse of dominance. This is necessitated by the need
to provide special assistance to SMEs, the lack of market dynamism, and the
need to protect consumers from exploitative practices. For example, in the
context of predatory pricing, stagnant markets mean that the requirement for
proof of a reasonable likelihood of recoupment of lost profit may be overly
stringent. Preservation of existing competitors may need to be accorded greater
weight if subsequent market entry in response to price increases by the
successful predator is unlikely to materialize. Once the existing competitors have
been driven out of the market, the predating firm may face no further threats to
its dominance. The diversity of possible approaches to abuses of dominance,
such as predatory pricing, is affirmed by Budzinski's observation that
microeconomics and competition theories do not propound a single view on
whether a long-run decrease in market contestability is justified by short-run
price cuts. 1 Jurisdictions may legitimately differ on whether such a justification
is acceptable based on the preferences of society at large.
To the extent that a developing country has pursued industrial policies that
shield domestic firms from foreign competitors, leaving the domestic markets
uncompetitive, the competition authority should be more vigilant against
collusion, both express and tacit, by the domestic firms. In a stable market
populated by a small number of firms and protected by government barriers,
tacit collusion may be particularly easy to achieve."' This may be especially so if
the domestic firms maintain close ties with government officials, who may
directly or indirectly facilitate collusion. The possible increased incidence of tacit
collusion means that the hurdle for successful prosecution of such conduct will
need to be lowered. The authority may consider relaxing the standard of proof
for tacit collusion, perhaps by dropping the so-called "plus factors" from the
elements of proof."' 0
This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible
divergences necessitated by the characteristics by developing countries. Instead,
it seeks to demonstrate that there are so many fundamental differences in the
way that markets, the economy, the judiciary, and the political system function in
developed and developing countries that it is unrealistic to expect the same
18 See Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition at 4-4 (cited in note 31).
189 See Lawrence A. Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes, The Law ofAntitrust:An Integrated Handbook 172-
74 (West 2000).
190 "Plus factors" are additional facts that the plaintiff may prove to strengthen the inference of
collusion from merely parallel conduct. They include "an oligopolistic market structure, advance
posting of parallel prices, a history of price fixing or exchange of price information." Hovenkamp,
FederalAntitrust Polity: The Law of Competition and Its Practice at 175 (cited in note 150).
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competition law rules to apply effectively to both of them. If one believes that
competition law principles should reflect their surrounding socio-economic
environment, substantive divergences instead of convergences should be the
norm.
VII. CULTURAL VARIATIONS AND CONVERGENCE
The last, and perhaps most controversial, obstacle to convergence is the
need to take into account how cultural norms affect competition and market
behavior. Neoclassical economics and industrial organization, which has
underpinned the theoretical development and application of competition law for
a large part of the last thirty years, posits that consumers and firms are rational
and operate in a utility- or profit-maximizing manner. Over the last decade or so,
behavioral economists have challenged this fundamental assumption of
neoclassical economics, arguing that individuals do not always act in a rational
manner."' One implication of this stream of research is that consumers and
managers can no longer be assumed to be Homo Oeconomicus, reacting in the
same rational way to market events across cultures.
A. Cultural Norms and Competition
Sociologists and cross-cultural psychologists such as Geert Hofstede and
Shalom Schwartz have long recognized that cultural norms affect economic
behavior. Hofstede defines culture as "the collective programming of the mind which
distinguishes the members of one group from another."'92 He measures business culture
along four dimensions: masculinity versus femininity, individualism versus
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance.'93 The first three
191 See, for example, Maurice E. Stucke and Amanda P. Reeves, BehavioralAnitrust, 86 Ind L J 1527,
1570 (2011). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, ed, BehavioralLanw and Economics (2000).
192 Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizaions Across
Nations 9 (Sage 2d ed 2001).
193 See Hofstede, 8 Intl Studies Mgmt & Org at 46, 52-54 (cited in note 121). Hofstede later added
the fifth dimension of long-term orientation. Hofstede, Culture's Consequences at 359 (cited in note
192). Hofstede defines "power distance" as "[t]he extent to which the less powerful members of
institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed
unequally." Id at 98. He defines "uncertainty avoidance" as "[tlhe extent to which the members of
a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations." Id at 161. Furthermore, he
understands "individualism" and "collectivism" as follows: "Individualism stands for a society in
which the ties between individuals are loose[.] . . . Collectivism stands for a society in which
people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout
people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty." Id at 225.
Lastly, a "masculine society" is one in which social gender roles are clearly distinct. There is
greater emphasis on assertiveness, toughness, and material success, at least if they are exhibited
and pursued by men. A "feminine society" is one in which social gender roles overlap: "[b]oth
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dimensions in particular have been shown to influence attitude toward
competition. Cultures that are individualistic, masculine, and uncertainty-tolerant
generally hold a more positive attitude about competition.14 Meanwhile,
collectivist, feminine, and uncertainty-avoiding cultures tend to prefer
collaboration and eschew hard-nosed competition.195
In addition, cultural and historical development has been shown to affect
the prevailing norms of industrial organization. Richard Whitley has
demonstrated the links between the common forms of industrial organization in
the major East Asian countries, namely keiretsu in Japan, chaebols in South Korea,
and family businesses in the Chinese-speaking world, and their respective
historical institutional environments. He observes that the "strong separation of
ownership from control in large Japanese kaisha reflects the combination of
integrated vertical loyalties, political and economic differentiation and
decentralization and patterns of village organization in Tokugawa Japan." 196
Market dynamics have similarly been influenced by historical development in
Japan."' Whitley notes that relational contracting in Japan is less dependent on
personal ties than it is in China. The relatively impersonal connections between
firms are built instead on collective corporate identities. This, again, was
attributed to the governance structure in historical Japan.
B. Implications for Substantive Convergence
Cultural considerations may engender substantive divergences in
competition law. Social scientists have noted that trust, which is the
quintessential building block of cartels, is formed and maintained differently in
various cultures. Doney, Cannon, and Mullen argue that trust is less likely to
form in an individualistic and masculine society because of the greater incidence
of self-serving and opportunistic behavior, which is deemed more acceptable in
such a society than in a more collectivist society.1"' Moreover, the social sanction
for such behavior is likely to be higher in a more collectivist society than in a
men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life." Id at
297.
194 See Hofstede and Bond, 16 Org Dynamics at 10-15 (cited in note 32). But see Eva G. Green,
Jean-Claude Deschamp, and Dario Paez, Variation of Individualism and Collectivism within and between
20 Countries: A Typological Analysis, 36 J Cross-Cultural Psych 321, 334 (2005) (finding that
"competitiveness can be associated with both individualism and collectivism because it appeared
combined with both self-reliance and group-oriented interdependence").
195 See Hofstede and Bond, 16 Org Dynamics at 10-15 (cited in note 32).
196 Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets and Societies 171 (Sage 1992).
197 See id at 174-77.
198 Patricia M. Doney, Joseph P. Cannon, and Michael R. Mullen, Understanding the Influence of National
Culture on the Development ofTrust, 23 Acad Mgmt Rev 601, 601-12 (1998).
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more individualistic society. To the extent that individuals are highly trusting or
collectivist in certain cultures, which has been found to be the case in some East
Asian countries, cartel enforcement may need to be emphasized."'
There are reasons to believe that leniency programs may work less well in
collectivist cultures. Defection is likely to be frowned upon, given the social ties
among business executives in the same industry and the general aversion to
confrontations in such cultures. Not only will the defecting firm likely be
expelled from the trade association, but the business executives involved will
also likely be socially ostracized and lose business connections.20 In order to
increase the attractiveness of leniency and induce defection, criminal sanctions
may be necessary. Only when the cost of belated defection is prohibitively high,
as in the case of imprisonment, will firms break away from their cartels and take
advantage of leniency programs. Cultural considerations may thus bolster the
case for criminalization in more collectivist cultures. 201
Tacit collusion is similarly facilitated by the prevalence of trust and a
collectivist mentality, which means that the determination of the existence of
tacit collusion may also require adjustment. One crucial difference between
cartels and tacit collusion is that the co-conspirators do not explicitly negotiate
with one another in the case of the latter. They must be able to reach terms of
understanding among themselves tacitly. In more collectivist cultures, tacit
understanding can be more easily attained: Co-conspirators can decipher and
predict each other's conduct with less uncertainty as the range of possible
conduct and motives will be narrower.202 A lower burden of proof for
substantiating a claim of tacit collusion may be appropriate. One may go even
further and reverse the burden of proof once the plaintiff has provided evidence
of parallel conduct. Once such evidence is furnished, the burden shifts to the
defendant to negate the existence of tacit collusion.
Cultural factors may also be pertinent to the treatment of facilitating
practices such as information exchanges. The general concern about these
199 Guiso and his co-authors found that the level of trust among different ethnic groups in the US
shows significant divergences, with Japanese Americans being most trusting and African
Americans being least so. See Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, Does Culture Affect
Economic Outcomes?, 20 J Econ Perspectives 23, 31 (Spring 2006).
200 As Ki Jong Lee noted, "[iun a culture[] which regards cartel as a form of cooperation rather than a
conspiracy for crime, an informer is nothing but a betrayer." Ki Jong Lee, Cultures and Cartels:
Cross-Cultural Psycbology for Antitrust Pokcies **8--9 (Loyola Law School, Institute for Consumer
Antitrust Studies Working Paper 2003), online at
http://www.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/pdfs/cultures.pdf (visited Oct 31,
2011).
201 For an excellent discussion of the recent trends in the criminalization of cartels, see Beaton-Wells
and Ezrachi, eds, Criminarng Cartels (cited in note 37).
202 See Doney, Cannon, and Mullen, 23 Acad Mgmt Rev at 610-11 (cited in note 198).
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practices is that they may facilitate collusion. 203 It follows that in cultures where
collusion is already easier to achieve, facilitating practices should be subject to
closer scrutiny. Price information circulated and price recommendations issued
by trade associations are more likely to lead to alignment in prices in countries
with a highly collectivist culture. Leaders of trade associations may hold greater
sway over their fellow members' business decisions. Competition authorities in
these countries hence may need to adopt a stricter standard for facilitating
practices.
Incorporation of cultural considerations in the design of competition law
does not imply a wholesale repudiation of the primacy of industrial organization
economics in competition law analysis. Far from it. Nor is it intended to imply
that there are fundamental differences in the way the competitive process
operates across countries. Firms and consumers largely behave in a similar
fashion across cultures. The differences are in degree rather than in kind.
However, there are instances where these minor differences may matter in how
competition law analyzes certain competitive conduct. These differences may
again call for divergent outcomes in the hard cases. Cultural considerations
hence may necessitate substantive divergences and limit the feasibility of
substantive convergence across the board.
C. Cultures and the Pursuit of Normative Convergence
Cultural considerations have even greater relevance for normative
convergence than substantive convergence. Differences in cultural norms
regarding competition directly bear on normative convergence. In some
countries, there is a general lack of awareness, both within the general public and
the bureaucracy, of the benefits of competition. If the awareness exists, it is
weak and easily retreats in the face of competing policy objectives. For example,
some countries have permitted the formation of cartels in the pursuit of
industrial policy.2 04 Government officials were even directly or indirectly
involved in the formation of these cartels. For example, when sales tax was first
introduced in Japan in 1989, the government allowed small and medium-sized
businesses to fix prices so that they could pass on the tax burden to
consumers. 205 There is much discussion within the international competition
203 See Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice at 180 (cited in note
150); Sullivan and Grimes, The Law ofAnitrust: An Integrated Handbook at 234 (cited in note 189).
204 See Gerber, Global Competition at 211-13 (cited in note 5); Wakui, Antimonopoly Law at 17 (cited in
note 5).
205 See Uesugi, 13 Geo Mason L Rev at 355-56 (cited in note 38).
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community about the inculcation of a "competition culture."206 There is growing
recognition that competition law will not achieve its full potential if it is not
supported by a culture in which there is general appreciation of the benefits of
207
competition. Competition law enforcement will not gain legitimacy in the eyes
of the public and receive the support it needs from the rest of the government
and society at large. In this sense, efforts to promote normative convergence are
to be welcomed.
It was argued earlier that a belief in the inherent merit of competition is not
shared across the globe. Social scientists have found that countries that are more
individualistic and uncertainty-tolerant are more likely to embrace competition.
If efforts to promote a "competition culture" are to be welcomed, how far
should such efforts go? Should we endeavor to raise the receptiveness to
competition to that of the individualistic and uncertainty-tolerant cultures?
There are reasons to believe that such an ambitious agenda is both unlikely to
succeed and ill-advised. It is unlikely to succeed because cultural norms and
values are notoriously impervious to change. Social scientists have shown that
cultures tend to remain very stable over time.208 While minor shifts are possible,
significant changes are very difficult to achieve.
More importantly, such an ambitious agenda is ill-advised because attempts
to harmonize cultural norms regarding competition presume a uniquely optimal
level of belief in competition for all countries. Whether such an optimal level
exists is open to dispute. A minimal level of faith in competition must prevail for
markets to reap the benefits of competition. For example, it is a commonplace
assumption in competition law that cartels are harmful to consumers. This is a
reflection of the fundamental belief that firms are expected to compete and that
such competition will benefit consumers. The aforementioned example of
government-endorsed cartelization in certain countries is an apt illustration. The
cartelization policy does not tinker with the degree of competition among firms;
competition is eliminated altogether. Government-endorsed cartelization is most
certainly a bad policy from the perspective of competition. There is an
unassailable case for aligning cultural norms regarding competition beyond this
basic level, where such overt stymying of competition is tolerated if not
encouraged.
206 ICN Advocacy Working Group, Advocag and Competition Polcy *31 (ICN 2002), online at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf (visited Oct 26,
2011).
207 See id at **25-40.
208 See Ronald F. Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, ModerniZation, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of
Traditional Values, 65 Am Socio Rev 19, 21-22 (2000).
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However, once one moves beyond this minimum level of acceptance of
competition, different cultures may understandably and legitimately differ on
whether competition is to be maximized to the extent possible. While it is easy
to agree that a complete displacement of competition is detrimental, the
consensus breaks down once the question turns into one of degree. In particular,
divergences arise in abuse of dominance. Here the question is not whether firms
should be made to compete, but how vigorously they are allowed to compete.
There are many areas of abuse of dominance, such as exclusive dealing,
predatory pricing, and unilateral refusal to deal, that require difficult judgment
calls. In particular, in calibrating the stringency of the legal standards for these
practices, a jurisdiction will need to decide whether it prefers to err on the side
of encouraging competition at the risk of under-protecting smaller firms from
exclusionary conduct or on the side of over-protection of smaller firms at the
risk of stifling competition and indulging inefficient firms. How this balance is
struck is, to some extent, dependent on the prevalent cultural beliefs about
competition in a given jurisdiction. Attempts to foster normative convergence
by enforcing a common set of substantive rules across countries will be
counterproductive. Such a project risks creating such a sharp divide between
legal rules and cultural norms that it will undermine the legitimacy of the entire
competition law enterprise in the eyes of the general public.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In light of the myriad divergences among jurisdictions, or even within
individual jurisdictions, on some of the fundamental aspects of competition law,
such as the range and meaning of its policy goals, the state of economic
development and differences in how markets function, and cultural norms about
competition, it is unlikely that deep convergence encompassing procedural,
substantive, and normative aspects of competition law will be attainable over the
short term. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that this Article does not
suggest a wholesale repudiation of the convergence project. Convergence has,
no doubt, improved the quality of enforcement in the emerging jurisdictions.
Much useful knowledge and expertise has been transferred through capacity
building and technical assistance programs to emerging jurisdictions. It has
brought about a more sophisticated understanding and use of economic
concepts in competition law analysis, focusing on the effects rather than the
form of business conduct. This is an encouraging development.
This Article adds to the existing literature on convergence by questioning
the facile assumption that a universally applicable set of competition law
principles exists and should be followed across the globe. This Article has
hopefully illustrated that such an assumption is highly questionable. Competition
law principles and doctrines must be fashioned and applied with an acute
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awareness of the local economic and socio-cultural environment. The lack of
experience and expertise of most emerging jurisdictions in fact places a greater
responsibility on established jurisdictions and international organizations to
exercise care when forging and formulating an international consensus.
Recommendations and best practices need to be prepared with their target
audience in mind. The consensus builders must be aware that what has worked
in their jurisdictions may not achieve the same results in other jurisdictions. If
possible, caveats should be incorporated in the consensus documents so that
emerging jurisdictions are aware of possible grounds for divergent practices. If
that proves impossible, the onus falls on the officials involved in technical
assistance programs to familiarize themselves with the recipient jurisdiction's
economic and socio-cultural environment and to assist local officials in
identifying needs for possible local adaptations. Only then will we achieve
sensible convergence, one that reduces global divergences of competition law
without neglecting local circumstances.
Vol 12 No. 2490
